- 1244 calls for a return of refugees, as well as of Serb military and government bodies to Kosovo.  This has yet to happen.

- In legalese, the 1244 clause about taking into "full consideration" the unsigned Rambouillet diktat isn't a green light for independence. It simply means that aspects of Rambouillet can perhaps be considered. Prior to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Clinton Administration and Kosovo Albanian nationalists wrote a clause in Rambouillet which would've (if signed) permitted Kosovo to vote on independence after three years from the accord's signing. I specifically recall noted American University law professor Paul Williams bragging about his having written that segment on Geraldo Rivera's MSNBC cable news show. No one questioned Williams' objectivity as a then adviser to the Kosovo Albanian nationalist leaders. Madeleine Albright was quoted as having said that Rambouillet was written in a way that was unacceptable to the Serbs. An obvious pretext for starting the war that was to be.

- The "final outcome" status for Kosovo is stated towards the end of 1244. It relates to how Kosovo should be governed as a part of Serbia. What other logical way can be otherwise suggested when the very same document recognizes Kosovo as part of Serbia, while stating that refugees, Serb government and military bodies should all return to that province?
 
Bill Clinton's UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke leads a pack of Democratic Party affiliated foreign policy politicos advocating Kosovo independence. They argue how Kosovo will become more violent if independence isn't granted. Is this rational not a blueprint for encouraging violence elsewhere by effectively saying that peaceful means will not get the same consideration? Why should independence be granted to a group threatening  violence? Isn't such an acquiesce a support for law of the jungle principles?
 
Holbrooke claims that Kosovo is the "special case" for independence unlike some other disputed former Communist bloc territories. On this point, Lavrov can easily outdo him by noting how Trans-Dniester has a much better case for independence than Kosovo.
 
The lines have been drawn. Other nations have expressed sympathy with the Russian and Serb position. At the same time, the vestiges of neo-liberal and neo-conservative antipathy towards Serbia remains a strong guiding factor in American foreign policy. The art of diplomacy seeks a middle course to such a dispute. This would lead one to believe that a compromise of sorts could be in the works. Writing in The Washington Times (March 20), former Serbian Unity Congress President Michael Djordjevich sees the possibility of a partition of Kosovo.
 
Bosnia, in a way, already serves as a precedent for such an arrangement and in this case it means that the Bosnian Serb republic "Republika Srpska" (RS) has a greater case for independence than Kosovo. The signed Dayton Accords governing Bosnia states that each of the two established Bosnian entities can establish their own parallel relationships with other states after a four year period from the document's signing in 1995. Unlike Kosovo: in RS, there's no noticeable ethnic violence, with many refugees having returned to its territory.
 
What’s really spooky about all of this is how Anglo-American mass media outlets at large haven't fully explained all of the valid particulars related to opposing Kosovo's independence. This kind of a "free press" makes it easy for officialdom to hustle policies like the "humanitarian" bombing of Yugoslavia.
 
Russia and America have a number of common interests. Why risk a betterment in Russo-American relations by supporting a faulty premised Kosovo independence?