- outright independence from Serbia
- broad autonomy within it
- partition

So far, none of these proposals have received mutual support from the involved parties.  For the moment, it is hard to envision any of the mentioned options becoming jointly accepted by Serbs and Albanians (reference "Kosovo: No endgame in sight," Serbianna, Aug. 16).

Of recent note, the partition idea has gained some limited steam.  Serbs won't be satisfied with a split giving them a small strip of territory in Mitrovica.  In reply to a settlement having Mitrovica going to Serbia, a prominent Albanian (Bajram Redxepi, in the Aug. 17, edition of the Novi Sad based Dnevnik) cockily said that such a move would have to include the mostly Albanian inhabited Presevo Valley in Serbia (but outside of Kosovo) going to a hypothetical Albanian Kosovo nation.  The Albanians are definitely reluctant to consider a partition giving the Serbs more than Mitrovica.

Another thought comes to mind, which distantly relates to two disputed Caucasus regions. This idea is farfetched and submitted for the purpose of seeking a workable resolution to the Kosovo dispute.

Is it possible for Kosovo to be both independent and a part of Serbia?  This thought falls somewhere in between Kosovo breaking off from Serbia or Kosovo remaining in Serbia, but with great autonomy.  It relates to the disputed former Soviet territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The two have been affiliated with Russia for a continuously lengthy period prior to and during the Soviet Union's existence.  These two regions have also had an even longer relationship as a part of Georgia as distinct entities.  Many Abkhazians and South Ossetians are Russian citizens.  Georgia and the rest of the international community formally recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia.  Abkhazia and South Ossetia prefer being closer to Russia than the post Soviet Georgian governments.  Is it not possible to work out a mutually agreeable arrangement for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to have a joint affiliation with Russia and Georgia?  Granted, this suggestion will face opposition.  How much more unworkable is it from the other options on record?

There's suggestive support for this approach.  As excerpted from the last paragraph of Zaal Anjaparidze's "Shade of Kosovo Over Georgia," (Eurasian Home, Expert Panel, June 13): "The emerging new challenges with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia must logically lead Georgian leadership to the understanding of the urgent need of the genuinely new ideas and proposals for settlement of these conflicts.  These proposals must be acceptable for the Abkhazians and Ossetians simultaneously comply with the interests of the international players. Georgian national interests have long become a hostage of the interests and aspirations of international players and this factor significantly influences the country’s domestic and foreign policies."

Not to be overlooked is the adage: "the more history changes, the more it remains the same".  Georgia sought to become a Russian protectorate in the early 18 hundreds.  Presently, one can find many Russia leaning Georgians.  Many Albanians fought with the Serbs in the legendary 14th century battle of Kosovo.  Albanians and Serbs were allies in one of the Balkan wars of the last century.  Outside of Kosovo, a good number of Albanians reside in other parts of Serbia.  The Albanian-Serb relationship has been more problematical than the Georgian-Russian one.

The Albanian dominated and largely ethnically cleansed Kosovo is far from showing itself worthy of governing itself as an independent nation.  The rest of Serbia reveals a peaceful multi-ethnic society, with Kosovo's Albanian majority not wanting to be a part of it.  It is suggested that the post Cold War "globalization" stresses inter-ethnic dependency over ethnic exclusivity.  In conjunction with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, this globalization point supports keeping Serbia within Kosovo.

Over time, history keeps coming up with intriguingly new political phenomena.  Sometimes, it is the same old, same old route with different twists.  This latter particular can have its played out aspects.  Hence, the search for more original ideas.  On the issue of some disputed territories, just how off the wall is it for the international community to develop some kind of a joint custody principle, akin to the basis of parental rights in a divorce settlement; where mother and father are still recognized as parents?

The heightened global respect for the idea of national self determination can in some instances significantly conflict with the enhanced worldwide sympathy for human rights issues.  Propaganda aside, Kosovo is one such definitive instance where national self determination and human rights collide.  The straw man Slobodan Milosevic did not create the Kosovo conflict and is not largely responsible for the current predicament.  Overlooking decades of ongoing Albanian nationalist transgressions is bad history at best and outright deceit at worst.  These points prevent me from enthusiastically advocating any thought in favor of Kosovo independence.
The national self determination of the Serbs can not be wished away from Kosovo in favor of what the Albanian side wants.  Something that the more non-partisan and Serb unfriendly of observers should consider to fully understand the situation.

Given the realities of present day Kosovo, some international oversight on that territory appears in need for the coming years.  During this period, a symbiotically creative plan for independence and continued affiliation with Serbia could be hypothetically detailed, approved and implemented.  Albanians opposed to this arrangement could have Kurdistan (in northern Iraq, as well as possibly parts of Turkey and Syria) referenced to them as a territory more deserving of full independence.  Serbs uncomfortable with this proposal could ponder the possibility of completely losing Kosovo.

In the long run, delaying Kosovo's "final status" provides the Albanian side with the potential to better implement its wish for full independence from Serbia.  Since 1999 (when the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia ended), the Albanian side has been well funded to better establish on the ground facts in their favor in Kosovo.  This as Serb interests have been pretty much kept out.  On the other hand, the Albanians risk the possibility of pro-Serb amendments during a prolonged delay of Kosovo's final status.  Especially if the Kosovo Albanian leadership falters in developing a successful economy and political structure.  Added to the Albanian concern is the firm pro-Serb resolve of Russia and some other nations.

The bottom line is that there has yet to be an impasse reached.  How long can this not so "frozen" conflict remain unsettled?