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The Former Yugoslav Commentary By Michael Averko January 15, 2008 Alexis Papachelas' December 31 Kathimerini article Greeks and Serbs' shared DNA, drew understandable wrath for the belief that Serbia is pursuing a romantically misguided policy on Kosovo. An acquaintance of mine wrote: "all I can say is unbelievable, especially coming from a Greek". With all due respect, it is not so surprising, seeing how every group has their willing advocates, who go against more popularly held views. Sometimes, the minority can be coherent and other times not. It was good to see Kathimerini post/publish the replies of William Dorich and Liz Milanovich. The political likes of Papachelas can be successfully challenged, when such requests for doing so are granted. The two key elements being the request to challenge, followed by that desire getting okayed. This relates to the given media's preference for one view over the other. Some of the newer and smaller news outlets are instituted with the idea of challenging the biases found at the more established media sources. In this sense, the former venues are not the initiators of one sided presentations. Rather, they are responding to predominating slants. This point does not excuse shoddy reporting and commentary, which can be found in all levels of media. Papachelas links Serbia's economic problems with the support for its territorial sovereignty. He glosses over the questionable ability of whether an independent "Kosova" (the Albanian spelled/pronounced version) can successfully govern itself. A hypothetically failed "Kosova" nation does not benefit Serbia. In comparison, it is beneficial for Kosovo and the rest of Serbia to be loosely affiliated with each other. Papachelas is of the apparent mindset that it is best to please the influential political forces in the West supporting "Kosova" independence. Why bend over backwards to entities who disrespect you and provide limited assistance, with strings attached? Papachelas overlooks how Western (particularly neo-liberal) policies have not been successful in much of the former Communist bloc. They did not work in Russia, thereby explaining why George Soros and the neo-cons are not popular in that country. In Moldova, Russian President Vladimir Putin is more popular than Moldova's president and the presidents of Ukraine and the US. In Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester), libertarian Texas Republican Congressman Ron Paul is relatively popular. It is most unfortunate that Russia and Serbia are not on better terms with the West. The main reason for this predicament are some of the Western stances taken towards Russia and Serbia. Brazenly declaring that Kosovo will be independent unlike other disputed former Communist bloc territories, is not the position of an impartial observer. On another former Yugoslav topic, Marko Hoare's January 4 Greater Surbiton commentary What do the figures for the Bosnian war-dead tell us? is an anti-Serb/pro-Bosniak review of his cited casualty figures during the Bosnian Civil War. The Sarajevo based Research and Documentation Center (RDC) report he references is aligned with organizations like the George Soros funded International Crisis Group (ICG). The ICG is far from being a great representative of politically diverse thinking. Just look at the listing of people it employs and note the views left out. A more direct backer of the RDC is the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The USIP is structured in a way to reflect the predominating views in the American Democratic and Republican foreign policy establishments. This makeup can limit the diversity of quality analysis on a foreign policy issue. Daniel Serwer is the lead USIP person on former Yugoslav affairs. Over the years, he has consistently taken anti-Serb positions. The counter-reply on favoritism can apply to other sources having different ideas from Hoare, Soros and Serwer. For accuracy sake, it is therefore imperative to perform a thorough analytical overview. The best way to understand a geopolitical situation is to comprehensively study all views of the involved parties. This especially pertains to those ideas running contrary to one's own perspectives. There can be misrepresentations when commenting on disagreeable views. In other instances, it is a matter of two or more plausible opinions differing with each other. On the surface, the 2007 RDC report is a break from the blatant anti-Serb propaganda of the last decade. The veracity of that campaign continues to influence the opinions of many. Indeed, the stated purpose of the RDC report was to reverse the trumping up of casualty figures for propaganda purposes. The "better late than never" attitude should not excuse the issue of when the truth was most needed. Specifically, at the time of the conflict, in order to form the best possible opinions of what was happening and how to appropriately deal with it. It is not as if there was no reasoned data before the RDC report, which conclusively showed a Bosnian Civil War casualty figure ranging between 75,000-125,000. Such accounting was ditched in favor of the bloated 200,000 claim. Some claims went as high as 350,000. About ten years ago, a then member of the neo-liberal leaning Center for Strategic and International Studies privately said to me that the 200,000 casualty figure was off the wall. He added that this view had merit towards the end of the Bosnian Civil War. Others including George Kenney stated likewise. Kenney is a former US State Department official, who left the Serb bashing elitny, upon making an earnest attempt of reviewing the Serb perspective and questioning the pro-Izetbegovic viewpoint. The trumped up 200,000 figure blamed mostly on the Serbs, was used as a pretext for NATO's 1999 attack on Serbia, when Belgrade fought against Kosovo Liberation Army separatists. Exaggerating Albanian civilian casualties in Kosovo was also used to warrant NATO action against Serbia. Hoare predictably agrees with the proportionate ethnic breakdown of Bosnian Civil War casualty numbers, while second guessing the roundabout 100,000 total death tally. For him, the higher civilian death ratio of Muslims to Serbs is a talking point to depict the Serbs as the overwhelming aggressor. Keep in mind the World War II civilian death ratio of Japanese to Americans. The Serb side was the militarily superior force during the Bosnian Civil War. A conflict which saw pro-Izetbegovic forces stationed in civilian areas, where they were known to initiate attacks. The "collateral damage" claim is not one reserved for Americans, Israelis and Turks. In numerous wars, the militarily stronger side has inflicted the most civilian casualties. How is Hoare's second guessing of the RDC report's 100,000 total casualty figure better developed than questioning the proportionate ethnic breakdown of casualties in the same report? In certain influential circles, there continues to be a skewed readiness to accept Muslim claims over Serb ones. Hoare takes issue with the opinion of the RDC report's researchers, who believe that the Bosnian Civil War death toll has a 10,000 margin of error. He mentions other global conflicts, where according to him, the casualty figures could be easily recorded as much higher; due to war related diseases and starvation deaths not included in a tally. In doing so, Hoare does not make the case that such a discrepancy existed in Bosnia. Bosnia is not Biafra, where war related mass starvation deaths were evident. Bosnia is also not a humid swampy jungle, prone to developing large scale disease. Many of the individuals accepting Hoare's interpretation of the RDC report's roundabout 100,000 death toll figure and proportionate ethnic breakdown of casualties, had no doubt accepted the much ballyhooed 200,000 tally and absurdly false Bosnian Civil War rape number claims; initially made by advocates for Izetbegovic's regime. Due to the lack of fact based merit, the grossly over-exaggerated rape numbers are no longer discussed to great degree. For a number of reasons, war related casualty figures get fudged. Stanley Karnow's PBS documentary about US military involvement in Southeast Asia told of how reported American kills would be inflated to receive greater reward rations in the form of alcohol. The South Vietnamese army acted similarly. To prevent defeat, the side losing to the Serbs in Bosnia desired international military action against the winning combatant. Hence, the Serbs are modern day Nazis route was concocted. This script complemented mass media's desire to nurture interest in a foreign civil war, in a place many do not know and-or care about. The sensationalistic Holocaust all over again mantra is likely to draw in more viewers than a non-hysterically extended feature detailing the events concerning the Bosnian Civil War. Lacking Capital Hill lobbying clout, the Serbs were an easy target. Hoare's accounting of Muslim-Croat violence among themselves leaves out pertinent variables. Croats make up a significantly lesser number of Bosnia's population, when compared to each of the respective Serb and Muslim populations. With this in mind, it is perfectly understandable why the Croat-Muslim casualty figure would be less than the Serb-Muslim one. For a good period during the Bosnian Civil War, Croat-Muslim skirmishes were reported as greater than armed Serb actions. This was noted in the back pages of The New York Times. At least one New York Times article observed how Croats fled Izetbegovic held areas for Serb zones. Hoare omits commenting about Muslim on Muslim violence, while noting the relatively small number of Serbs fighting on the Izetbegovic side. What was the greater reality: Serbs fighting Serbs, or Muslims fighting each other? Anti-Izetbegovic/secular Muslim leader Fikret Abdic had a noticeable following in Bosnia. Show me a comparable Serb leader who willingly fought on the Izetbegovic side. Besides Muslims fighting Muslims, there were instances of Serb and Croat military cooperation against Izetbegovic forces during the Bosnian Civil War. At times, such Serb and Croat cooperation included Abdic and his fellow Muslim supporters. A number of Serbs, Croats, Muslims and others situated in Bosnia during the war would strongly dispute this excerpted claim made by Hoare: "while the Bosnian Army was sometimes guilty of war crimes, it did not pursue a policy of deliberately targeting Serb or Croat civilians." The Sarajevo breadline massacre likely involved Muslims. If true, it is not clear whether those Muslims can be categorized as part of the "Bosnian Army" (Izetbegovic's side). Armed pro-Izetbegovic activity against Croats in Mostar indicates that civilians were deliberately targeted. In other parts of Bosnia, pro-Izetbegovic forces were known to violate internationally brokered cease fires. These scenarios included the targeting of civilians. Hoare correctly notes that the Bosnian Civil War was primarily about differing views on whether Bosnia should exist as a post-Communist independent state. He is wrong for believing that the Bosnian Civil War was not a three way conflict. Instead, he prefers the overly romanticized view of multi-ethnically tolerant Croats, Muslims and Serbs opposing evil Serb nationalists. In addition to downplaying Croat-Muslim differences, Hoare ignores how Bosnia's Christian majority of Serbs and Croats feel. On a PBS NewsHour segment, former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that Bosnia has pretty much been a hodgepodge of competing national sympathies. Bosnia's Croats and Serbs tend to identify more with their respective neighboring state of ethnic related origin than an independent Bosnia. In Bosnia, the Muslim plurality are the prime supporters of a unified Bosnia. There was the discussed idea to partition Bosnia into three distinct zones (Croat, Serb and Muslim) by the Serb and Croat leaders (Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic). This point leads to the view that the Bosnian Civil War might have ended sooner and with less casualties, had there not been the kind of foreign intervention which essentially egged on the Izetbegovic regime and the 1995 Croat ethnic cleansing of 150,000 Krajina Serbs. What occurred in Krajina highlights some of the fundamental differences between many Croats and Serbs. At the same time, it is not accurate to definitively portray a unified Croat-Muslim front against Serbs. Such an attempt reminds me of how some Russia unfriendly observers try to de-emphasize the historic Polish-Ukrainian differences, in an effort to forge a Warsaw-Kiev alliance to offset Russia and pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine. Hoare's broad negative swipes at Edward Herman, David Peterson, Nebojsa Malic and Noam Chomsky are somewhat ironic. His commentary does not show a comparatively better objectivity to what happened in Bosnia and elsewhere. Hoare's preference for the Izetbegovic regime is clear cut. His weltanschauung appears to compliment Stephen Schwartz. Ignoring Hoare is an oversight of a viewpoint that frequently goes unchallenged. In a December 29 commentary, Hoare uncritically mentions former Turkish Prime Minister Tancu Ciller and the recently assassinated Pakistani political figure Benazir Bhutto. The following is excerpted from Hoare's December 29 piece: "Bhutto and Turkey's Tansu Ciller, both democratically elected women leaders of two of the world's largest Muslim nations..." FYI, Pakistan and Turkey are not more democratic than Russia and Serbia. In conjunction with Turkey's official policy, Ciller does not (at least from what I am aware of) acknowledge the genocide of Christian Armenians by Muslim Turks. What constitutes the greater genocide: what occurred in Bosnia or Turkey? For that matter, pre-World War II Vilnius and some other European cities had sizeable Jewish populations. Nazi actions put an end to that significant Jewish presence. As is true with other parts of Bosnia, Sarajevo continues to have a large Muslim community. This commentary is written with the knowledge that it can be twisted into something different from what has been said. Serb suffering in Bosnia was real and the efforts to belittle this matter are repulsive. The latter point includes the faulty notion that the Serbs deserve the harsh treatment they have received. I watched the 1992 Summer Olympic basketball championship game between the US and Croatia with some disgust. Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) was barred from participating in that Olympiad because of the predominating anti-Serb prejudices, which found their way in the International Olympic Committee (IOC). At the 1992 Summer Olympics, Serb teams were banned and individual Serb athletes were made to compete as independent participants not representing their country. Try finding similar punitive IOC measures taken against other countries for direct and-or indirect involvement in military actions. Another vulgarity from that period was the closing of the Yugoslav national airlines (Jugoslav Air Transport, JAT) office in Manhattan's Rockefeller Center. Pasted on the JAT office's window was a US State Department letter saying that the office was closed because the government of Yugoslavia was believed to be providing military aid to the Bosnian Serbs. Meantime, the Clinton administration winked at Iranian arms shipments to Izetbegovic via Croatia. The Croats skimmed off some of the arms for themselves. Croatia was never penalized for arming their brethren in Bosnia. A factor which was evident from the beginning of the Bosnian Civil War. During that conflict, the Croat military received training from a Virginia situated American firm. Croat-Serb cooperation in Bosnia declined when the West (notably the Clinton administration) sent out feelers to Zagreb, indicating that Croatia would be allowed to takeover Serb inhabited Krajina without Western reprisal. Clinton's Balkan point man, Richard Holbrooke referred to the Croat military as his "junkyard dogs". At odds with the Bosnian Serb leadership and seeking greater legitimacy from the West, Milosevic had the Yugoslav armed forces in idle during Croatia's ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs. My last Serbianna column addresses Hoare's comments about Srebrenica and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. A slightly updated version of it is on line. Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. His commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson's Russia List, Russia Blog, The New York Times and The Tiraspol Times. |
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