There are a good number of nations unwilling to recognize Kosovo's independence. Their numbers and reasoned perspective indicate that Kosovo is far from being a fully settled conflict. For varying reasons, the European Union (EU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) each have members that are not gung ho on recognizing Kosovo's independence. EU nations Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain see how such recognition threatens their current boundaries, which include territory where a given minority group predominates. This matter has global implications in other multi-ethnic countries. It relates to why several OIC states appear reluctant to recognize Kosovo's independence. In addition, there is the appearance of Kosovo becoming a military beachhead for NATO. This is troubling to those individuals who found fault with the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) and 2003 American led attack on Iraq.

Within the former Czechoslovakia (Slovakia and the Czech Republic) there is much sympathy for the Serb position. 1938 saw Western acquiescence as Poland, Hungary and Germany violated the borders of Czechoslovakia. A few years later, Czechoslovakia's territorial sovereignty pretty much returned to its pre-1938 standing. The post-Cold War Czechoslovak breakup into two independent entities does not serve as a good pretext for taking Kosovo away from Serbia. Czechoslovakia consisted of two republics, whereas Kosovo has been a part of Serbia. Unlike the Serb and Albanian communities, the Czechs and Slovaks reached a common understanding in their separation.

To support America's image, a typical American mass media pundit attitude goes along the lines of: the decision has been made to recognize Kosovo's independence - and to backtrack shows weakness. In actuality, the reverse is true. It is weak to maintain a flawed advocacy. On the other hand, it takes character to admit wrong and make an improved adjustment.

Along with some other ethnically troubled lands, the Cypriot and Northern Irish conflicts have been given lengthy time for ongoing negotiations. With this in mind, there is no legitimate basis to rush an enforced judgement against one of the directly involved parties to the Kosovo issue.

As has been stated elsewhere, Kosovo's glaring socioeconomic problems are not a great case for a questionably independent state. There have been several news segments showing Kosovo Albanians happy about independence, but concerned about the not so great economic conditions they face. Serbia minus Kosovo is economically better off. A truly independent Kosovo would not be so dependent on the existing foreign presence in that land. The problematical Kosovo Albanian leadership and taxing socioeconomic conditions in that territory could eventually frustrate the pro-independence position into looking at another option. Any Serb sovereignty over Kosovo must of course be predicated on the notion that Belgrade will have to do its share in assisting Kosovo's economy. Since 1999, Serbia has been paying off Kosovo's foreign debt.

Russian and Chinese opposition to Kosovo's independence is not likely to wane anytime soon. Kosovo will not achieve United Nations (UN) membership and is unlikely to be granted International Olympic Committee representation. The disrespecting of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 should be a diplomatic eyesore for the pro-Kosovo independence side. UNSCR 1244 recognizes Kosovo as a continued part of Serbia and specifies that relationship to be enhanced in the form of Belgrade having a limited military and civil servant presence in Kosovo. Allowing Kosovo into the UN as an independent state without Serb approval would be among the most absurd of implementations by that organization. This is saying a lot seeing how the UN has had its share of absurdities.

Some see Russia's non-support of independence for Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester), Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a sign of weakness. On the contrary, it shows a reasonable consistency, much unlike some other nations. There is something positive to be said about taking a more even handed approach towards a dispute. It better ensures future goodwill than taking an overly partisan position that is not in one's best interests. The selling out of Czechoslovakia in 1938 helped nurture World War II. The decision by some to recognize Kosovo's independence has further complicated an existing quagmire.

English language mass media is ironically filled with commentary about how Russia and Serbia must come to their senses. This is to be expected from that structure which on the whole, has been one sided in its presentation of Kosovo. The confidently slanted features can have a numbing effect; given that the other perspective is either muted down, or in some instances, omitted altogether.

The American military experience in Southeast Asia saw how the US was not willing to stick out a conflict like their North Vietnamese and Vietcong opponents. Similar murmurs suggest the same in relation to America's armed involvement in Iraq. Besides the US, a number of EU nations are doing much of the "nation building" in Kosovo. As previously noted, the EU is not united on recognizing Kosovo's independence.

Lawrence Eagleburger, John Bolton, Peter Rodman and Ruth Wedgwood are American mainstream thinking foreign policy observers, who have stated opposition to Kosovo's independence. There are other Americans with the same view. An existing opposition base is evident. Many of these individuals will no doubt be monitoring the situation in and around Kosovo.

Albanian dominated Kosovo wants membership in the UN and IOC. Serbia, Russia, China and others might accept this desire if there is full international agreement that Kosovo is an irrevocably autonomous part of Serbia. Recall that Soviet era Belarus and Ukraine had full UN membership and that several non-nations are in the IOC.