A decade of military expansion

From Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo to as-yet unnamed bases in Romania and Bulgaria, the US has moved, especially since September 11th, to consolidate its military influence in the Balkans. Over the last ten years, analysts have explained this phenomenon in various ways. The US, some say, intends to develop unilateral control over Southern Europe. Such theories depict the US and Germany as overt partners, but covert competitors, in terms of seeking influence. US military buildup in the Balkans has also been regarded as just part of a general NATO move eastward, towards Russia’s borders.

Recently, however, the new priorities of the “war on terror” have allegedly set the US against NATO allies who it deems are too squeamish for future wars. In this light, US military acquisitions in non-NATO countries like Bulgaria and Romania gain an additional significance. For whatever reason, it is undeniable that the US has made steady military consolidation part of its policy in the Balkans. The present article examines some facets of the unfolding American policy, and its repercussions for the region.

Opportunity and danger: the US in Albania

Since the death of Enver Hoxha, the US has developed an increasing interest in Albania. In “helping” the weakest country in Europe, America also put the final nail in the Communist coffin, and eliminated the possibility of anarchic Albania’s ever going back into the red. Since 1992, the US (and strategic ally Turkey) have poured money and guns into Albanian coffers. Tirana was invited to participate in NATO’s “partnership for peace” exercises, and American warships visited Albania’s coast for the first time. A new geostrategic initiative was unfolding: the military buildup of US client states, Albania and Turkey, situated at the ends of the Balkans, hemming in former Yugoslavia and Greece. Or at least that was the idea.

In 1997, Albania descended into political anarchy. General lawlessness prevailed, and the arsenals were looted. So were government offices, with the result that 100,000 blank passports were stolen. Some of these ended up in the hands of Islamic terrorists from distant lands, and the weapons went to the KLA. It was only the Italians, fearful of uncontrolled immigration, who took measures put a stop to the chaos. Although Albania has since righted itself (with heavy outside support), it remains volatile. It is alleged that rural, mountainous parts of northeast Albania have slipped from government control; the interfamilial vendetta, long suppressed by the Communists, is said to be making a comeback.

More ominous still is the fact that Albania has been linked with Islamic extremists- and even bin Laden himself, who sought refuge there just a few years ago. In recent months, foreign “humanitarian” organizations and businessmen have been exposed as fronts for al Qaida. While the average Albanian is not very extreme in his religious views, the country’s vulnerability, and consequent need for support, has meant a fateful courtship with several dubious sponsors- from Iranian mullahs to Chechen rebels to Saudi banks. Over the past decade, while the US was making strides to arm the Albanians, a parallel phenomenon was developing: the infiltration of foreign “holy warriors,” willing and ready to fight in Bosnia and Kosovo.

A forced friendship: Greece and Turkey in NATO

As an inevitable result of their mutual suspicions, Turkey and Greece are both NATO members. Clearly, joining up with the US-sponsored organization was an offer they couldn’t refuse. Neither state could ever risk the political- and military- isolation of voluntary estrangement from the United States. In any case, they wouldn’t have had a choice. After all, when Turkey invaded Cyprus back in 1974, it was only covert US pressure that prevented Britain from doing the honourable thing and rushing to the defense of its former colony. Even if the American policy-makers were right to minimize the dangers of a potentially larger war, the message to Greece was clear: Turkey is a more important strategic ally than you are. With a population 80% smaller than that of its heavily armed eastern neighbor, Greece has had to negotiate the diplomatic waters very carefully indeed.

Turkey’s underlying value to the US, of course, is that it borders on traditionally dangerous states: Russia, Iran, Syria and Iraq. During the Gulf War, the American-Turkish base at Incirlik (south-eastern Turkey) was used as a base for air strikes against Saddam. It still is used for the same purpose even today. The strategic importance of Incirlik has led to several superb examples of political hypocrisy. The US, which claimed to be “protecting” Iraq’s Kurdish minority from Saddam, simultaneously turned a blind eye to Turkey’s decimation of its own Kurdish population.  This double standard remains the status quo in 2002.

Another application of US hypocrisy here involves the Armenian Genocide of 1915, when up to 3 million Armenians were slaughtered by the Turks. Although this is widely recognized, and was made an official part of French policy two years ago, the US Congress failed to pass a similar resolution near the end of President Clinton’s tenure. Although the vote was very close, it is alleged that Turkish threats- including the loss of privileges at Incirlik- prompted the Americans to be more ‘reasonable.’ In the end, little Armenia was not considered important enough to counterbalance Turkish influence.

Mixed blessings for the Greeks

Despite Turkey’s undisputed military and strategic power, Greece is not entirely helpless. It has a much higher standard of living, and a more stable economy and institutions, than its neighbor across the Aegean. It has highly attractive investment potential and a very lucrative tourism sector. In short, Greece is a regional prizefighter. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, it has emerged as the heavyweight champion of the Balkans. Across all sectors, Greek businesses continue to make large acquisitions in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albanian and Serbia- even while many residents of these countries remit funds home, earned from their illegal employment in Greece.

Undoubtedly, the act of buying controlling stakes in banking, communications, oil and related industries also buys Greece influence and political clout, extending far beyond its borders. Yet this is not entirely bad for Greece’s Balkan neighbors. Since a peaceful and prosperous Greece is essential to the stability of Southeast Europe, Greek economic dominance might be the least painful price they can pay. When it comes to the larger world of NATO countries, however, Greek influence wanes. Political embarrassment often results from the divergence between the geostrategic motivations of Greece’s leaders, on the one hand, and the virulently anti-NATO sentiment of its citizens, on the other. During NATO’s bombing of Kosovo, for instance, huge street protests and media hostility reminded the ruling oligarchy of the strong opposition felt by 98% of the population.

Anti-NATO feelings continued even after the bombing had ended. On his December 1999 visit, President Clinton was less than overjoyed with the protests and riots that greeted him in Athens. Although Simitis and Co. immediately switched over into damage control mode, the Americans reacted with threats of a subtler nature: the annual US State Department report branded Greece a state afflicted by “terrorism,” citing the mysterious leftist group, November 17. No one from this group has ever been arrested, and its actions have been few and far between- and mostly carried out against other Greeks. The American pronouncement of terrorism, however, pushed Greece into a diplomatic corner. Despite assurances of its continuing cooperation, Greece has suffered even more from the State Department report, in the aftermath of September 11th. Since 1999, when the population made its opinion known, Greece has suffered a quiet loss of confidence from NATO and the US. With a war on Iraq becoming more likely, Turkey has become even more important to American policymakers. In addition, America has chosen two new friends to help satisfy its desires in the Balkans- Bulgaria and Romania.

Bulgaria and Romania: willing consorts

American military expansion to the easternmost reaches of the Balkans is reminiscent of ancient Stoic philosophy’s dictum about the dog and the wagon. Picture a dog tied to a wagon; it is happy when it runs along with the wagon, but if it tries to resist, it will be unhappily forced to go along, against its will.

This vignette illustrates the shared situation of Bulgaria and Romania. Wishing to avoid the fate of Yugoslavia, these neighboring states are chafing at the bit to be allowed into NATO. Although crime and corruption (endemic to both states) forced the two off of NATO’s expansion “A list” two years ago, US military bosses have become far more enthusiastic after September 11th. And, whereas Yugoslavia rejected the infamous Rambouillet accord, which would have granted NATO forces the run of the country, Bulgaria and Romania are instead opening their arms to such an occupation. The Associated Press reported (on 1 April) that, “…in preparation for NATO membership, both Romania and Bulgaria already have signed agreements permitting the basing of alliance troops on their territory and allowing unrestricted overflights of their warplanes. …the United States will start using Constanta's port in June to move NATO-led peacekeepers in and out of the Balkans.”

Other adventures

In addition to these new opportunities, America is continuing with its Balkan operations already in progress. These involve hunting for terrorists in Bosnia, rooting out war criminals in the Republika Srpska, and “peacekeeping” in Macedonia. Here NATO troops linger on, despite repeated promises last summer for a maximum stay of thirty days. The heart of the Balkan operations, however, is Kosovo, where the heavily fortified Camp Bondsteel belies America’s promise of a limited presence. The largest foreign base since World War II, Bondsteel hosts a fitness center, cinema, and shops. If Macedonian complaints about the Americans’ failure to police the border are true, the formidable American soldiery would seem to be spending most of its time on such pleasant diversions.

Conclusions

Taken together, these examples constitute strong evidence for an American fortification of the Balkans. In part, the new strategic developments are a result of NATO’s last big adventure- the bombing of Yugoslavia- but also of the new priorities unique to the “war on terror.” Greece’s halfhearted support for the 1999 attacks has meant a tacit demotion, from which Romania and Bulgaria are only too happy to benefit. Both nations also claim to be key players in the ever-unfolding “war on terror:” a Romanian official recently claimed that his country’s military intelligence was a “major asset” to the Americans. Putting the finishing touches on the reconfigured Balkans is Turkey, which has also been enthusiastic about fighting terror. Turkey’s good behavior will result in more handouts to shore up its weak economy, and some amount of diplomatic leverage in Greek affairs.

In general, the next few years in the Balkans should see a general shift northward, as the US consolidates control over an enlarged alliance, one which will touch Russia’s borders and hem in Yugoslavia- or what is left of it. Indeed, the Balkans of the future will be a far different place than it was before 1992, when the only regional powers were Yugoslavia and Greece. Back then it would have seemed impossible that NATO could expand so completely, or that America could profit so greatly from the suffering of others. Yet in this case, as in so many others, to the victors belong the spoils.