May 10, 2006 - The European Commission’s decision last week to call off talks on a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia-Montenegro for its failure to arrest war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic had to do with the rule of law but also with credibility.
 
It was about the credibility of the EU Council of Ministers, which on February 27 threatened to disrupt talks. It was also about the credibility of the Commission and in particular Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn who had set an April deadline for the arrest and then postponed it for May upon assurances that the job would be done.
 
It is all about the credibility of Belgrade, which has lost it by failing to deliver and must now use all of its powers in order to urgently restore it and avoid putting new strains on its relations with Brussels.
 
Indeed, sticking to credibility is key in the Western Balkans on the road to Europe.

But this should also be applied with regard to the future of Kosovo and the referendum on independence in Montenegro, two processes where credibility has been seriously challenged.

The UN and the EU have lost credibility over Kosovo by constantly lowering the criteria for their “standards before status” policy.

Nowadays, the Kosovo Albanians want to fulfill the human rights standards only as a trade off for their maximalist demand of an independence from Serbia. The Serbs refuse to participate in the Albanian-dominated Kosovo institutions because they do not want to become once more part of a cosmetic multiethnic makeup, which would give fake credibility to the Kosovo parliament.
 
Credibility is now particularly crucial in Montenegro as well, as it prepares to vote on a referendum on independence on May 21.
 
True, the EU has been very reluctant on the referendum issue and has expressed on various occasions its opposition to the tiny republic’s independence: lack of administrative capacity, a non-diversified economy which would put Podgorica on the top of EU’s subsidies list, a tarnished reputation of a Prime minister which turned from a communist apparatchik to a Slobodan Milosevic ally and then to a leader of the independence movement.
 
True, many say that the breakup of a union of Serbia and Montenegro – sharing unprecedented ethnic, religious, language, letter, cultural and historical ties -- is a completely unecessary burden for the two of them, for the region and for Europe.
 
But the rules for the referendum have been set and accepted by all the political forces in Montenegro and by the European Union, which mediated in the process: supporters of Montenegrin independence now need more than 55 percent of votes in order to achieve their goal.
 
There are only two options and both are very clear. One – you get 55% plus one vote and there is independence. Two – you get 55% minus one vote and Montenegro remains part of the State of Serbia-Montenegro and finally ends its three-year long obstruction of the Constitutional Charter, thus paving the way for a more functional state and a speedier EU integration.
 
That should be made clear to all those who speculate about the so-called “grey zone” – a result for the pro-independence bloc which would be between 50 % and 55 % of the vote.
 
On several occasions, the pro-independence bloc has tried to play with the “grey zone”, suggesting that in that case, they would push for a loose structure they call a “Union of independent states”.
 
Such a structure – which presuposes of course ‘independence’ – has been rejected by Belgrade which wants to create a functional state of Serbia and Montenegro, not a weaker and looser union.
 
The EU – and most notably the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana – have clearly said that “the grey zone does not and cannot exist”.
 
It is unfortunate however to see that a few experts from EU-funded institutions – a think-tank and a regional cooperation initiative – have been openly lobbying in favor of the “grey zone”, thus undermining EU’s own mediation and credibility.
 
An urgent arrest of Ratko Mladic by the Belgrade authorities, an immediate resumption of talks on stabilization and association with Serbia-Montenegro and its fast entry into the NATO programme Partnership for Peace, a strict respect of the Montenegrin referendum agreement and pressure on attaining a compromise solution for Kosovo, with full respect of international law and of the legitimate interests of all sides.
 
That should be the roadmap for the Western Balkans’ road towards the EU this year.
 
With credibility for all.