During the Cold War, US foreign policy used Yugoslavia as a counterweight and proxy against the Soviet Union. The US gave economic, military, and diplomatic aid to Yugoslavia when Tito broke from the Soviet bloc in 1948. The US regarded Tito as a “statesman”, “world leader”, and “political giant” even though he could be seen as a “dictator” and Communist “strongman”. So long as he was a proxy of the US, human rights abuses in Yugoslavia were covered-up and suppressed and overlooked. Indeed, Yugoslavia was praised by the US for its human rights record. Political trials, arrests, imprisonment, and even assassinations, were overlooked, so long as Yugoslavia was of use to the US. Dissidents were ignored so long as Yugoslavia remained a US proxy and useful in the Cold War. Human rights were exploited and manipulated by US foreign policy during this period.

Yugoslav Dissidents: Milovan Djilas

There was widespread dissent during the Informbiro or Cominform period in Yugoslav history from 1948 to 1955. There was even dissent within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) itself. The Josip Broz Tito regime responded to this dissent by political “repression”, by arresting and imprisoning dissidents. Many “pro-Soviet” Yugoslav dissidents were arrested and sent to prisons and labor camps. In 1949, the Goli Otok prison camp was established in Yugoslavia, on Goli Otok Island. The prison camp at Goli Otok was set-up for the internment of "supporters of the Informbiro."

Milovan Djilas, one of the top Communist leaders of Yugoslavia, emerged as a Yugoslav dissident in the 1950s.  He was one of the most prominent dissidents to be imprisoned by the Tito regime. In 1944, and again in 1948, he had been sent to the Soviet Union for discussions with Joseph Stalin on establishing and maintaining relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. He was seen as the eventual successor to Tito.

Djilas, although he remained a Communist, rejected the rigidity of Communist dogma. He founded a new journal, Nova Misao, "New Thought", in which he analyzed issues dealing with socialism and Communism from a critical standpoint. He called for greater democracy in the Yugoslav Communist Party in 19 articles he wrote for the Borba or Conflict, a Communist party publication from October, 1953 to January, 1954. Djilas wanted “real freedom” which precluded a one party Communist monopoly on political power in Yugoslavia. His appeals for democratization within Communist Yugoslavia met with opposition from Communist leaders within the government and party.

On January 17, 1954, Djilas’ expulsion from the Yugoslav government followed. He had been the second in command to Tito and had been the vice-president of Yugoslavia and was regarded as the heir-apparent. His expulsion resulted after a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was convened in Belgrade from January 16 to 19, 1954, presided over by Tito. He subsequently was removed from all of his Communist Party positions. Djilas ultimately resigned from the Yugoslav Communist Party in April, 1954. Yugoslav Communist leaders opposed democratization because they did not want to be voted out of office or have their entrenched positions needlessly jeopardized by popular votes. Tito had no intention of relinquishing his control over the government of Yugoslavia. The regime sought to create a Communist Party monopoly, a “bureaucratic oligarchy” and had an “obsession with power”. Opposition and dissent would not be tolerated. Why would Tito voluntarily give up his leadership of Yugoslavia or put it in jeopardy or risk? Djilas had to go.

Richard Nixon introducing Tito in 1971 in Washington

Liberalization in the Communist bloc increased in the early 1950s. In 1951, the Yugoslav economy was decentralized and in 1953 collectivization was abandoned. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 resulted in a relaxation of tensions. Djilas emerged in this political climate of liberalization.

On December 24, 1954, Djilas wrote that his goal was "to escape from the unreal, abstract world of the 'elite' and 'chosen' men and to enter at last the real world of simple, hard-working people and ordinary human relationships."

In December, 1954, Djilas gave an interview to the New York Times in which he asserted that Yugoslavia was ruled by "reactionaries" and called for the creation of a second political party to oppose the Communist Party. Djilas, along with Vladimir Dedijer, was charged with engaging in hostile propaganda against the Yugoslav government. He was subsequently brought to trial and convicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The sentence was suspended.

Djilas was arrested again in 1955 and released on probation, He continued, however, to criticize the regime in foreign publications. In 1956, he was sentenced to three years in prison for his criticism of the Yugoslav government position on the Hungarian revolt. He continued to criticize the regime and supported the Hungarian revolt.

In 1957, while in prison, Djilas smuggled for publication in the West of The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, in which he argued that communism in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe was creating “a new class” or caste of Communist party elites who made up a rigid privileged party bureaucracy and hierarchy. The system was neither classless nor egalitarian.

On October 4, 1957, he was imprisoned for spreading hostile propaganda. He was sentenced to an additional seven years in prison for the “deliberate intent to compromise both socialism as an idea and the international worker’s movement” and for “seeking to undermine the peoples’ authority, defense, and economic power”. He was released on probation on January 21, 1961.

He was imprisoned again in April, 1962 for publishing Conversations with Stalin in which he was accused of “disclosing official secrets”. He was tried and convicted in a secret one-day trial and sentenced to five years in prison.  He was also to serve the three years and eight months remaining on his earlier sentence for publishing The New Class. On December 31, 1966, Djilas was released from prison after serving more than half of his eight years and eight month prison sentence.

He was imprisoned by the Communist regime in the Sremska Mitrovica prison, which, ironically, was the same prison where he had been a prisoner under the Royalist Yugoslav government in the 1930s.

Yugoslav Dissidents: Mihajlo Mihajlov

Nikita S. Khrushchev sought closer Soviet ties to Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s following the death of Joseph Stalin. He initiated “a thaw” in relations with the West and with Yugoslavia in the 1950s, the “de-Stalinization” or “liberalization” program of reforms. Khrushchev’s reforms created an expectation of change and improvements in foreign relations and in domestic freedoms. On October 13, 1964, Khrushchev was removed from power and replaced by Leonid I. Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin, and Nikolai V. Podgorny who immediately began a “re-Stalinization” or a return to the rigidity of the pre-Khrushchev era.

Tito and Nixon with their wives.

Mihajlo Mihajlov was another prominent Yugoslav dissident during the Cold War. Mihajlov was a Serbian academic who visited Moscow in the summer of 1964, before the ouster of Khrushchev, when dissent and critical views were much more tolerated. Mihajlov planned to publish his three-part series, entitled “Moscow Summer 1964” in the Belgrade monthly Delo. Following the appearance of the articles, he was arrested on March 4, 1965, and the accusation was that he had “slandered” the “brotherly Soviet Union” and that his critical views represented a new form of Djilasism.” The Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Aleksandr Puzanov, had protested to Tito about Mihajlov’s articles in a meeting he had with him.

Tito maintained a policy of “steering a middle course between East and West”. He played one superpower bloc off against the other. In this way, he was able maintain his freedom of action and to maintain political and economic stability and viability. According to Mihajlov, “Tito then enjoyed the U.S.’ full support”. Yugoslavia was perceived as an “ally” and “friend”, even a “client state”, of the US. US foreign policy saw Yugoslavia as a pawn that could be used as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. Yugoslavia was a pawn, but a highly prized pawn for both the US and USSR. Tito was able to exploit the position of Yugoslavia as a buffer state between East and West to wring political, economic, and military concessions from both blocs.

Tito was erroneously seen as the man most responsible for destroying the Kremlin monopoly of the Communist Movement or bloc. US policy was so rigidly ideologically based that it neglected to see the fissures in the movement. Tito’s role in the founding of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries also magnified his prestige and stature not only in the US and the West, but in the Third World and with the developing countries.

On April 29, 1965, Mihajlov was tried in the Zadar District Court for “damaging the reputation of a foreign State” and for violating the Yugoslav Press Law by submitting an article for publication in a foreign journal or periodical.  He had written that there had been camps or gulags for dissenters in the Soviet Union even in 1921 under V.I. Lenin. This was one of the major accusations made against him. The next day he was found guilty and sentenced to 9 months in prison. His sentence was subsequently suspended and he was put on probation.

In 1966, Mihajlov was again arrested, tried, and convicted and sentenced to 3 and-a-half years in prison for publishing an independent journal. On October 7, 1974, he was arrested again. On February 25, 1975, he was tried for disseminating “hostile propaganda”, convicted and sentenced to 7-and-a-half years in prison. In the fall of 1976, Kansas Senator Robert Dole arrived in Yugoslavia to visit him. His visit was denied by the Yugoslav government. Once he was allowed to leave in 1978 on May 25, an arrest warrant was issued for him in Yugoslavia and his citizenship was revoked. Ironically, Slobodan Milosevic reinstated his citizenship.

In the US, the Committee to Aid Democratic Dissidents in Yugoslavia (CADDY) was formed by Myron Kolatch, the editor of The New Leader, an anti-socialist, anti-communist US labor publication. The Committee was formed under the auspices of Democracy International at Freedom House. The Committee was chaired by Mihajlov, Djilas and Franjo Tudjman, which published a monthly bulletin which was printed and distributed by the AFL-CIO. The bulletin was edited by the Croat Rusko Matulic. According to Mihajlov, Tudjman was “not yet a fanatical nationalist”.

Los Angeles Times from 1976 showing the arrest of the 5 Croatian hijackers of the TWA airliner.

Assassinations in the US

During the Cold War, Yugoslav government agents operating in the US, Europe, and Australia, assassinated Yugoslav dissidents. Yugoslav UDBA or secret police agents killed opponents and critics of the Communist regime abroad.
 
UDBA, or Uprava drzavne bezbednosti/sigurnosti/varnosti. was the Yugoslav State Security Administration or Directorate or Secret Police. The UDBA emerged from OZNA, Organ Zastite Naroda Armije (Department for Protection of the People) was a security agency of the communist Yugoslavia formed on May 13, 1944 under the leadership of Aleksandar Rankovi?. Military intelligence was overseen by KOS (Kontraobavjestajna sluzba), the Counterintelligence Service of JNA, the Yugoslav National Army. UDBA was formed in 1946 and was responsible for Yugoslav internal state security until 1991. The UDBA targeted "domestic enemies", “right-wing bourgeois”, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian separatists, Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim religious leaders, former Ustasha officials, Serbian royalist Chetniks, members of the Cominform, separatists, and nationalists.

The FBI told Yugoslav dissident Mihajlo Mihajlov that the Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) planned to assassinate him in the US. The Tito regime had UDBA “liquidators” that assassinated perceived opponents of the regime in the US and the West. These assassinations were the Yugoslav version of “targeted killings” and were conducted in the US and in Western Europe.

In the US, Dragisa Kasikovic, the editor of the Serbian-American journal Sloboda-Liberty and his successor were suspected to have been assassinated by the UDBA.  Dragisa Kasikovic was stabbed to death along with his nine-year-old step-daughter Ivanka Milosevic in Chicago, Illinois in 1977. The UDBA was also suspected in the following murders of prominent Serbian émigrés: Ratko Obradovic in Munich, West Germany in 1969, Sava Cubrilovic in Stockholm, Sweden in 1969, Jakov Ljotic in Munich, Germany in 1974, Boro Blagojevic in Brussels, Belgium in 1975, Miodrag Boskovic in Brussels in 1976, Dusan Sedlar in Dusseldorf, West Germany in 1980, and Petar Valic in 1975.

Dragisa Kasikovic, an outspoken Serbian dissident, and his nine-year-old foster daughter, Ivanka Milosevic, were killed in the offices of the Serb National Defense in Chicago, Illinois on June 19, 1977. Dragisa was stabbed 64 times while Ivanka was stabbed 58 times. Members of the Serbian diaspora community in the US suspected that a Yugoslav secret police agent called Bogoje Panajtovic committed the murders. Yugoslav agents targeted editors and journalists from Serbian publications and media in the US, such as Vaskrs Srbije, Beli orao, Srpska borba, and Iskra. In addition to Dragisa Kasikovic, the Yugoslav secret service is suspected to have killed 27 other prominent Serb émigrés in the U.S., including Borislav Vasiljevic and Bogdan Mamula.  In Canada, Rade Panic, Petar Manevic, Petar Kljajic were suspected of having been assassinated by Yugoslav agents.

In the 1950s, UDBA agents attempted to assassinate former Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic and Branimir Jelic. On April 9, 1957, UDBA agents are believed to have shot Pavelic twice in Argentina in an assassination attempt. Pavelic was wounded and transferred to Madrid, Spain where he is believed to have died from his injuries on December 28, 1959. One Croatian dissident was kidnapped while another attempt was unsuccessful.

In the 1960s, there were 20 assassinations of Croatian dissidents. There were four failed assassination attempts. The UDBA is believed to have kidnapped Ratline organizer and former Ustasha cleric Krunoslav Draganovic in Italy. Vjekoslav Maks Luburi? was believed to have been assassinated by an agent, Ilija Stanic, of the UDBA, the Yugoslav secret service, on April 20, 1969, after Stani? infiltrated Luburi?'s organization. Ilija Stani? was Luburi?'s godson, and the son of Luburi?'s comrade-in-arms, Vinko Stanic.

These assassinations came after Tito dismissed Alesandr Rankovic, the chief of the UDBA, in 1966 after the Fourth Plenary Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists on the island of Brioni on July 1, 1966. Tito focused his efforts on going after dissidents abroad while relaxing measures domestically.

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1966, the UDBA was reorganized as the State Security Service (SDB). The functions of the SDB were outlined as follows:

1) to act against the internal enemies of Yugoslavia;
2) to protect Yugoslavia from foreign intelligence services;
3) to act against anti-Yugoslav political émigrés;
4) to protect Yugoslav political and public officials;
5) to protect civil defense structures;
6) to engage in criminal prosecution;
7) to inform of any enemy activities against Yugoslavia.

In the 1970s, 28 Croat dissidents and émigrés were assassinated while 13 were unsuccessful. Yugoslav intelligence agents are suspected of assassinating Croat emigre Ante Bruno Busic, a militant Croatian separatist active in the Croatian Spring movement, on October 16, 1978 in Paris, France.

In the 1980s, 17 Croat dissidents were believed to have been assassinated by the UDBA. In all 67 Croatian, 12 Serbian, and 4 Albanian dissidents were believed to have been assassinated.

The income of the guest workers provided one third of the Yugoslav budget. The assassinations were meant to stifle dissent by going after editors and prominent leaders in the diaspora to induce censorship. During the 1970s and 1980s, more than 40 people were killed in West Germany by the UDBA. The CIA and the KGB killed less dissidents than Tito’s UDBA did in the West. Zeljko Raznatovic, known as Arkan, was one of the UDBA liquidators beginning in 1973. Arkan would later emerge as an ersatz Serbian “nationalist” and devout Orthodox Christian after the break-up of Yugoslavia, even though he spent most of his life as a Communist and atheist and anti-nationalist. Arkan was himself assassinated on January 15, 2000.

In 1995, former prisoners at the Goli Otok camp sought damages for their incarceration as political dissidents.

Anti-Communist Activities

Yugoslav dissidents in the US engaged in terrorist attacks against Yugoslav interests and targets in the US. Serbian dissident Dragisa Kasikovic admitted to a US federal grand jury that he had participated in the bombing of the Yugoslav Embassy in the US in 1967. He was imprisoned for not disclosing the names of his coconspirators in the bombing although he was granted immunity from prosecution.

Croatian terrorist attacks in the US were widespread during the Cold War. Croatian terrorism was based on ultra-nationalism and separatism, achieving an independent state of Croatia. On September 10, 1976, TWA flight 355 was hijacked by five Croatian nationalists, Zvonko Busic, his wife Julienne Eden Busic, Petar Matanic, Frane Pesut, and Marko Vlasic, shortly after it took off from New York's JFK airport bound for Chicago. They re-routed the flight to Paris, France, seizing 86 passengers. There were no weapons aboard the plane, but explosives were left behind in a Grand Central Station baggage locker. A 26 year old Bomb Squad Officer, Brian Murray, was killed while trying to deactivate the bomb.

Tito meeting Jimmy Carter in Washington in 1978

Croatian immigrant Zvonko Busic, a Croatian ultra-nationalist and separatist, born in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was the lead hijacker, with his wife, Julienne Eden Busic, an American citizen, who was also on board. They were both sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten and eight years respectively. Julienne was paroled after 13 years, but Zvonko remains in federal prison in the maximum security prison at Terre Haute, Indiana. He was transferred there from the Leavenworth federal prison in Kansas.

He is regarded as a hero in Croatia for his Croatian ultra-nationalism and extremism. In 1987 he escaped from prison but was captured after a day on the run. He had been a member of Odpor, an extremist Croatian ultra-nationalist group, and demanded that leaflets advocating Croatian independence be distributed before they surrendered in 1976.

The five Croatian ultra-nationalists who hijacked TWA flight 355 were armed with modeling clay and electrical tape, from which they fashioned imitation explosive devices. They convinced the passengers and crew that they were prepared to die for their cause, the independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The airplane stopped in Newfoundland and Iceland en route to Paris, France, where the hijackers surrendered. They had placed the explosives in a locker at Grand Central Station to convince the authorities that the fake explosives on board the aircraft were real.

Zvonko Busic and Julienne Eden Busic were tried, and found guilty, and both sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten and eight years respectively a mandatory life in prison for "air piracy resulting in a death". While in prison after her conviction in the hijacking, she was struck with a hammer in 1979 by Lynette “Squeaky” Fromme, who was part of the Charles Manson Family and who was imprisoned for the assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford.

After Julienne was paroled she went to live in Croatia in 1995. She was a member of the Croatian Embassy in Washington, DC in the 1990s, immediately hired by the Croatian government after her release from prison. She was also a senior adviser in the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia after her release from prison. From a convicted hijacker and terrorist she was transformed into a Croatian diplomat. One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.

Julienne described the 1976 hijacking: “[W]e had no weapons, only a metal pot and some clay, which would later be used to fashion something that looked like a bomb.… My husband simply went into the cockpit and handed a note to the pilot, saying the plane was hijacked.”

Julienne Busic described the motive for the attack as frustration over the cooperation between Yugoslavia and the US: “The Yugoslav Secret police had been assassinating Croatian dissidents around the world, many of them our friends and even relatives. We were shot at twice, once in Berlin, and another time in Frankfurt. We moved to the United States and still the threats continued. All our legal attempts to bring the situation to the attention of the press and authorities failed. At the time, the U.S. and Yugoslavia were close allies and America was not interested in criticizing.”

Julienne Busic rationalized the reason for the terrorist hijacking: “[B]y 1976 I had became aware of the repression he, his family, and his people, the Croatians, lived under during Tito's reign, and so had to choose whether to violate man-made law in the service of a higher law, a natural law. I was acting this time on the basis of a fear that my husband would soon be murdered and also deep political beliefs that the criminality of the Tito regime had to be publicized and stopped before it was too late.”

The Croatian terrorist group was called the Croatian National Resistance, or Otpor or Odpor. It was founded by Vjekoslav “Maks” Luburic, a leader of the World War II Croatian NDH Ustasha government, which was allied with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The group was active in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland, San Francisco, Toronto, Europe, and South America.

The Croatian Freedom Fighters (CFF) were motivated by the goal to achieve the “independence” of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The group was a separatist and secessionist group. They engaged in terrorist bombings and attacks in the US. The group attacked Yugoslav business and financial interests in the US and pro-Yugoslav Croats. In 1980, members of the CFF were suspected in the bombing of the Statue of Liberty.

On December 29, 1975, eleven people were killed in a bombing at LaGuardia airport in New York. Zvonko Busic is a suspect in this bombing, although he has denied any involvement in that case.

In 1987, Zvonko Busic, a leader of the CFF, escaped from his prison cell in Otisville, NY, but was quickly apprehended 2 days later after being caught sleeping behind a building 40 miles away.

Gerald Ford and Betty Ford leaving Surcin airport in Belgrade in 1975

Croatian terrorist attacks against Yugoslav targets in the US continued in the 1980s. On March 17, 1980, a bomb exploded at a Yugoslav bank office in a 30-floor office building in New York City, shattering the windows. No injuries were reported although the police reported several had been treated for shock. An anonymous male caller informed the FBI later that Croatian Freedom Fighters were responsible for placing the bomb. The caller directed agents to a Port Authority bus terminal locker where a letter was subsequently located. He said that the contents of the letter should be made public early that evening or two more bombs would be set off. The contents of the letter revealed the demands of the Croatian terrorists: "There will be coordinated actions by Croats at home and in emigration until Yugoslavia is destroyed and a free and independent Croatian state is established… [I]f even one Croat is delivered up to Yugoslavia or to any other country, Croats throughout the world will take action of unforeseen proportions."

On May 26, 1980, in San Pedro, California, a store and restaurant owned by two Americans of Yugoslavian origin were bombed. This bombing was reportedly by the Croatian Freedom Fighters. No injuries were sustained. One of the owners was supposedly a supporter of the Communist regime of Tito.

On June 4, 1980, a bomb exploded at the Washington, D.C., home of Vladimir Sindjelic, the charge d'affaires of Yugoslavia. The bomb was placed in a window box outside the sitting room. No one was injured in the explosion which caused damage to the structure. A group of Croatian nationalists, Croatian Freedom Fighters, claimed "full responsibility" for the bombing, which they explained, in a letter sent to the Washington Post, was a “sign of protest” against the Yugoslav Communist government because of its treatment of the Croatian movement's supporters.

In response to the UDBA assassinations, Croatian separatists targeted Yugoslav political leaders and officials abroad. Croatian ultra-nationalists and separatists have used terrorism and assassinations since at least 1971 against Yugoslav officials abroad. Croatian nationalists and separatists were involved in a series of assassination attempts in West Germany and Paraguay. At least 50 persons are believed to have been killed since 1972 in terrorist acts by Croatian separatists.

On January 23, 1981, in New York, a pipe bomb exploded in the sub-basement of the New York State Supreme Court Building in lower Manhattan, New York. The bombing halted trial sessions and forced over 2,000 employees, lawyers, and jurors, to evacuate the building. There were no reported injuries. The explosion damaged water pipes and shattered glass. A caller who identified himself as being a member of the Croatian Freedom Fighters, warned UPI that a bomb would explode "somewhere in the city." He did not reveal what structure was targeted for the bombing. The caller explained that his group was "protesting the American government's ignorance and approval of Yugoslavian persecution of Croatian dissidents." A Puerto Rican terrorist organization also later claimed responsibility for the bombing. Investigators said the Croatian terrorist group was most likely responsible for the bombing because of the type of explosive device used in the attack.

VIDEO: Tito turns against Stalin

East-West relations: Yugoslavia and the US

US foreign policy during the Cold War consisted of using Yugoslavia as a bulwark or counterweight against the Soviet bloc. Both Democratic and Republican Administrations pursued the same policy of maintaining Yugoslavia as a buffer between the two superpower blocs.

In 1970, US President Richard M. Nixon went to Belgrade to meet with Tito in a landmark visit lasting from September 30, to October 2, 1970. Nixon went to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Kumrovec, the birthplace of Tito. Nixon was the first US president to visit Belgrade and Yugoslavia. Tito had visited the US for the first time in 1963 when he met with President John F. Kennedy on October 17, 1963.

Nixon’s 42-hour visit was seen as a reaction to the Brezhnev Doctrine that emerged following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia had voted against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia at the UN, although generally, Yugoslavia voted with the Communist or Soviet bloc on most issues. The Brezhnev Doctrine allowed the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of a Socialist/Communist country whose system was threatened by internal or external threats. This was seen by Yugoslav leaders as a possible threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. President Nixon indicated that while supporting the spirit of independence of individual Yugoslav nationalities, America remained a staunch friend of Yugoslavia as an integral federalist state.

At the October 1 dinner in Belgrade, Nixon announced what was called “the Nixon Doctrine”:

“...We do not accept doctrines by which one power purposes to abridge the right of other countries to shape their own destinies and to pursue their own legitimate interests. Every nation, large or small, has the duty to maintain its own security, but none has the right to do so by infringing the security of others.

You can be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The pursuit of total security by one nation can only lead to the insecurity of others, and therefore it will not bring order and peace.”

At that time Tito was concerned about what would happen to Yugoslavia when he left the political scene. A “fratricidal struggle” or “civil war” was foreseen among the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic groups. If the US tried to benefit from the quarrels of the individual Yugoslav nationalities, pursuing a divide and conquer policy, a civil war would emerge in Yugoslavia. President Nixon assured Tito that the US had no goal of “dividing” the Yugoslav nationalities by supporting separatist and nationalist groups. In 1970, Croatia was the most volatile and separatist region of Yugoslavia.

Tito visited Zagreb on October 2, 1970, where he was welcomed by Jakov Blazevic, the President of the Croatian National Assembly. President Nixon extolled "the spirit of Croatia, which has never been destroyed or enslaved". Nixon concluded by supporting Croatia within the Yugoslav federation: "Croatia will always live! Yugoslavia will always live! Long live Croatia! Long live Yugoslavia!" Nixon thus supported Croatian nationalism, but as long as Croatia was within Yugoslavia. This was a subtle bit of diplomatic and political legerdemain. The US opposed an independent Croatia as Croatian nationalists and separatists demanded. The bottom line was: The US supported the unity of Yugoslavia as an integrated federalist state or federation and did not support Croatian or Albanian separatism, officially. The Tito regime saw Nixon’s statements as encouraging and supportive of Communist Yugoslavia, which was trying to prevent pressure from the USSR at that time. Yugoslavia was reacting to the Brezhnev doctrine, perceived as advancing Soviet hegemony, by drawing closer to the West while maintaining its independence and nonalignment and sovereignty.

Nixon explained the purpose of the visit: “No chief of state or head of government that I have met has had more experience all over the world and has known more government leaders around the world than President Tito.

It has been very helpful to me to get his appraisal of the various trouble spots in the world and his best advice as to what policies could be adopted which could lead to peace and cooperation throughout the world.

It has been for us a very worthwhile visit….

That is why I looked to a continuing discussion with President Tito on these problems in which he gives me his best judgment, and I, in return, share with him my thoughts on problems that we have. Because after all, despite differences in systems of government, we have common goals: peace in the world and the right of each nation, each people, to choose its own system of government without outside interference.”

In his last sentence, Nixon clearly was responding to the Brezhnev Doctrine.

On October 27, 1971, Tito visited the US for a second time from October 27 to November 2, 1971 when he met with Nixon. The issues on this visit were economic and trade issues.

In 1971, the Yugoslav trade deficit was $1 billion. Moreover, the US had passed rigid protectionist trade policies. In 1971, US-Yugoslav trade exchanges totaled $208. Yugoslav trade exports to the US could be doubled, but the duties imposed by the US would affect two-thirds of these exports. What the Yugoslav delegation, which included Kiro Gligorov, an economics expert from Macedonia, wanted was preferential trade treatment. The US planned a $300 aid package to Yugoslavia and extended the time for repayment of the $58.5 million Yugoslav debt. A new Import-Export loan was also agreed upon.

These measures were meant to stabilize Yugoslavia economically and politically. Donald Bostwick, the vice-chairman of the American Export-Import Bank, had gone to Belgrade to negotiate the promised loans to Yugoslavia. In conversations with Yugoslav Finance Secretary Janko Smole, Bostwick further assessed the financing of capital goods and equipment to be imported from the US. Bostwick anticipated that the Export-Import Bank would enter into fifteen credit arrangement projects with Yugoslavia, which would total $200 million.

President Richard Nixon emphasized that closer political and economic relations between the two countries were the goals of the meetings:

“I recall on the occasion of the visit that I made to your country---the privilege of being the first President of the United States to visit Yugoslavia---the long talks that we had, not only about relations between our two countries but about the problems of the world generally. I look forward to resuming those talks today and on the occasions that we will meet while you are here. I know that our discussions will further the interests of better relations between our two countries, but will also contribute to the goal of peace in the world, to which you are dedicated and to which we are dedicated.”

On August 3 and 4, President Gerald R. Ford made an official visit to Yugoslavia. On August 4, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford met Tito in Belgrade for discussions. President Ford reaffirmed “the steadfast interest” of the United States and its support for the independence, integrity, and nonaligned position of Yugoslavia. The US delegation consisted of President Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Dick Cheney, Deputy Assistant to the President. President Gerald Ford and Betty Ford were photographed leaving Surcin airport in Belgrade after the meeting and discussions with Tito.

During the 1970s era of détente between East and West, Yugoslavia cultivated diplomatic relations with both the Communist bloc nations and with the Western nations. In 1971, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev made an official visit to Belgrade where a declaration reaffirming the political independence of Yugoslavia was signed. The Soviet Union sought closer ties with Yugoslavia. In November, 1976, Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia again. In August, 1977, Tito visited Moscow on his way to an official state visit to China. The relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union remained stable in the 1970s. Relations between the two countries remained strained because the Soviet Union opposed the independent road to Communism which Tito espoused which splintered and divided the Communist bloc. They also had divergent views about the "crisis of capitalism" and the approach to take against "capitalist governments". The Soviets also opposed Euro-communism, which stressed that Communist parties in Western Europe should develop policies based on local conditions, not solely rely on policies of the Communist Party of the USSR. Euro-communism was based on the writings of Antonio Gramsci and was popular in Italy and Spain. The Soviet Union wanted Cuban leader Fidel Castro to lead the nonaligned movement because he was more pro-Soviet. At the 1979 meeting of the nonaligned countries in Havana, Cuba, Tito opposed Fidel Castro’s pro-Soviet position, preferring a neutral position with regard to the two blocs.

Tito met with President Jimmy Carter when he visited the US on March 7, 1978. President Carter focused on the close relations between the two countries: “He's a man who believes in human rights…There is a feeling of personal friendship and warmth and admiration that exists among the people of the United States toward this great leader and the land which he has guided.” At this meeting, the prior agreements between Yugoslavia and the US made with the Kennedy, Nixon and Ford administrations, were reaffirmed. The Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had propped up and kept Communist Yugoslavia afloat to advance US foreign policy objectives. The Carter administration re-emphasized the role Yugoslavia played as a buffer and counterweight in the Cold War.

Yugoslavia: Cold War Role

Both Republican and Democratic administrations manipulated and exploited Yugoslavia, a leading country of the nonaligned bloc of nations, as a buffer and counterweight between the US and Soviet blocs during the Cold War. As long as Yugoslavia could be of use as a client or proxy state of the US, human rights violations and assassinations were overlooked and permitted. Dissent was likewise exploited and manipulated by the US. When Yugoslavia was no longer of use to US foreign policy, the country was allowed to implode into secessionist and separatist civil wars based on ethnicity and nationality.