The rivalries between the Great Powers precluded a consensus and a meaningful reform plan from emerging in the Kosovo vilayet. The international intervention was premised on contradictory and paradoxical assumptions: The Great Powers sought to maintain the status quo and yet to ameliorate conditions in the region. These assumptions yielded absurd and disastrous results. The international intervention in the Kosovo vilayet ultimately was an abysmal failure that only exacerbated the conflicts in the Balkans. The outcomes of this international intervention were the First and Second Balkans Wars, 1912-1913, and, finally, World War I, the Great War, 1914-1918.

The reforms did yield some short-term positive results. Nevertheless, these were primarily superficial improvements or achievements that did not address the inherent, fundamental core issues that needed to be resolved. The Civil Agents achieved some positive results. The Civil Agents obtained 30,930 Turkish pounds for aid to the Macedonia refugees and for reconstruction. Hilmi Pasha used 10,630 of this amount to reconstruct the homes destroyed during the insurgency. On April 4, 1904, 11,648 refugees were registered at the border posts into Macedonia. Hilmi Pasha claimed that 5,000 homes had been reconstructed since February, 1904. This information could not be verified. Louis Steeg, the French consul, reported that in the Monastir vilayet, the most devastated region, Christians were living in temporary shelters and that the destroyed villages remained in ruins. The villages around Ochrid and Kastoria were in “extreme misery”. Entire villages had been burned and looted and destroyed. Famine and a typhoid epidemic threatened the region. The British and French sent religious missions, the Lazaristes and the Sisters of Saint Vincent de Paul, to distribute flour. The insurgents were not completely disarmed. They kept some of their weapons which they secreted in the mountains. Skirmishes and battles between insurgents and Turkish forces continued after the arrival of the international forces.

	Italian members, carabinieri, of the international mission to the Kosovo vilayet, circa 1903.

They were able to reform the bekchi or rural guards as initially proposed under the Vienna or Viennese Plan of February, 1903. The bekchi were armed and used their position to intimidate and plunder and terrorize Christian villages. This was especially true in the vilayet of Kosovo where Albanian Muslim bekchi were able to deprive Serbian Christians of their civil and human rights. In March, 1904, the French consul to Monastir introduced a reform whereby Christian bekchi would be elected in the villages that had a Christian majority. In 1906, of a total of 6,840 bekchi, 3,259 were Christians while 3,581 were Muslims.

Muller wanted to destroy the revolutionary committees and thereby the Macedonian nationalist movement. This was because Austria-Hungary wanted to maintain the status quo in Macedonia. Muller saw the insurgents as “terrorists” and the insurgency as an example of “terrorism”. He wanted to “remove the terrorism of the revolutionaries.” Along with the Russian Agent, he wanted Turkey to institute “a decisive repression” over the revolutionary and nationalist movements. The Agents, thus, saw the insurgency as a threat to the reforms.

Another threat was the resistance and bad will of the Turkish government in the implementation of the reforms. Hazim Bey, the vali of Monastir refused the report of the Agents regarding administrative abuses, acts of violence, and judicial irregularities. Hilmi Pasha refused to act. The matter was settled by negotiations between the Russian and Austrian governments and the Turkish government. The Agents could only give advice and make suggestions to Hilmi Pasha. They could not make decisions. Hilmi Pasha had the ultimate discretion on whether to act on the reports of grievances.  Even though the Agents objected, General Baktiar Pasha was appointed the commander of Monastir, even though he was responsible for the destruction of Krushevo in August, 1903. The Agents did exercise a moral authority and forced the Turkish officials to account for their actions thereby inducing restraint.

	International mission to the Kosovo vilayet in Skopje. Wladimir von Giesl is first from the left in the third row from the top, Alfred Rappaport is next to him on the right.

“Six months of procrastination followed, and it was not until April, 1904, that it came fully into operation in Macedonia. Its results have been as disappointing as those of the first essay in amelioration. The state of Macedonia is if anything worse than it was in 1902. Something, however, has been gained. A further blow has been struck at the direct sovereignty of the Turks; and though the principle of an exclusive Austro-Russian control remains intact, some place has been found in the new scheme for the other Powers. It makes an advance towards the ideal of an international protectorate. “

A key part of the Murzsteg reforms was the readjusting of administrative divisions of Macedonia along more nationalist or ethnic lines. This objective was in conflict with the Murzsteg Reforms, which were based on the Russian and Austro-Hungarian policy to preserve the status quo in Macedonia. As a result, very little was actually achieved in restructuring the administrative division of Macedonia along national or ethnic bases.

The Creation of the Military Commission

Italian Lieutenant General Emilio Degiorgis arrived in February 1, 1904 in Constantinople as the head of the military commission charged with reforming or reorganizing the Turkish gendarmerie in the Kosovo vilayet. Enrico Albera and Major Rodolfo Ridolfi were part of the Italian mission. Ridolfi directed the Salonika school for chiefs of station. The first meeting of the military commission took place on February 8, 1904. Each Great Power sent a military delegate, referred to as “military deputies”. Six military attaches from the embassies also were part of the commission. Two more attaches were added to the commission, one for Degiorgis and another for the Russian officer on the commission. There were a total of 15 in the commission. The military commission met on a daily basis from February 8 to April 9, 1904. Brigadier General Osman Nizami Pasha and Colonel Zia Bey of the Turkish General Staff also attended the meetings which were conducted in French.

The six European Great Powers used the reforms to strengthen their position in Macedonia at the expense of the others. They were all jockeying for dominance in Macedonia. Germany sent a military deputy to Macedonia but did not take any initiatives in Macedonia, wishing to preserve its relations with Turkey. Austria-Hungary and Russia sponsored the reforms and were the most active. Russia faced a crisis in the Far West and was preoccupied with the ensuing conflict with Japan. This left Austria-Hungary as the dominant player in Macedonia and as the country the most determined to implement the Murzsteg reforms.

	Ottoman Turkish infantry troops arrive in the Kosovo vilayet circa 1903.

Britain, on the other hand, wanted to reduce Austrian influence in the Balkans. To counter the Austrian and Russian bloc, Britain wanted to form a bloc with France and Italy. Britain opposed the “encroachment” of Austria and Russia in “European Turkey”. Britain also opposed an Italian presence on the Adriatic coast and in Tripolitania, or western Libya. Britain wanted to safeguard the Mediterranean sea lanes to India. When Victor Imanuel III became king of Italy in 1900, he pursued a more aggressive policy towards the Balkans. He married Princess Helen of Montenegro and exerted greater Italian influence on the Adriatic coast, Albania, and Macedonia. The Italians opposed an Austrian presence in Salonika. There was thus conflict and tension between the Italian and Austrian members of the commission.

Degiorgis thus was hostile to Austrian initiatives and proposals. This lack of consensus and divisiveness only helped the Turkish government in scuttling or diminishing the effectiveness of the reforms. France supported the Austrian and Russian position because it wanted to maintain the status quo in Macedonia.

On February 13, 1904, talks were initiated on the division of the three vilayets into five sectors. Colonel Wladimir von Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché, requested to have the Skopje sector. Giesl had been part of the Austrian mission to Crete in 1897. Giesl would later become the Austrian ambassador to Serbia and would deliver the infamous ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914 that began World War I. Alfred Rappaport, along with Giesl, regarded as an Albania expert, was part of the Austrian consular mission in Skopje. Giesl later described the intense hostility which the Ottoman Turkish forces exhibited towards the European police and administrators mandated under the agreement. The Russian military attaché, General Kalnine, requested the sandzak of Salonika. They were seen as the “most directly interested” and thus should have a strategic position in Macedonia. This was the Skopje to Salonika axis.

Skopje was vital to the Austrian geopolitical strategy in the Balkans. It was an area that abutted the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, which Austria administered and occupied since the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Moreover, Skopje was important because this area was one where there was a Serbian majority. This southern region was termed Old or Ancient Serbia, Stara Srbija, the extent of Serbian settlement and expansion during the medieval period. Austria wanted to prevent Serbian expansion and infiltration in the Kumanovo-Skopje region. Austria also wanted to prevent a Serbian link-up with Montenegro which would give Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea. Austria thus could prevent the emergence of a “greater Serbia” or “a Serbian Piedmont” that would endanger Austrian expansion into the Balkans. The seed for World War I, conflict between Serbia and Austria, was already planted by this time.

	"Peasant girls in Old Servia" circa 1903.

Britain and Italy requested to know why the Albanian districts were excluded from the reforms. The following sandzaks were excluded: The sandzak of Koritza, except the caza of Kastoria, the sandzak of Elbassan, the western part of the caza of Ochrid, the districts of Debar and Prizren, the southwest sector of the sandzak of Pec, and the sandzaks of Tachlidja and Senitza of Novi Pazar. The rationale used was that article 3 of the Murzsteg program, which envisioned a division of the vilayets along homogenous national and ethnic lines, mandated it.

Austria also sought to prevent the sandzak of Monastir from being assigned to Italy. Austria sought to have Russia control the Monastir sector, but Russia declined the offer. At the meeting of April 5, 1904, the commission assigned five sectors: Austria-Hungary would control the sandzak of Skopje, Italy would control Monastir, Russia would control Salonika, France would control Seres, and Britain would control Drama. Austria was able to place a restriction on the Italian sector, stipulating that Degiorgis and his contingent should not reside in the same sector. Austria also was able to exclude the Albanian districts from the purview of the reforms.

What kind of authority should Degiorgis have over the gendarmerie? The commission decided that he should have effective control and direct command. Abdul Hamid, however, rejected this decision. He nominated General Mustafa Pasha to command the gendarmerie in the vilayets. The commission backed down. Degiogis would act only as an inspector, consultant, providing surveillance, but not making any decision himself. This handicapped the mission. Degiorgis requested the power to transmit orders to the ottoman officers and to denounce those who do not obey, to remove officers from the gendarmerie who are unfit or for behavior, and a written consent for the use of the officers and NCOs for a two year term. The Turkish government rejected these proposals as a violation of sovereignty. Russia and Austria argued that the effective implementation of article 2 required this power. Germany intervened on behalf of Turkey. Adolf Frieherr Marschall von Bieberstein, the German ambassador to Constantinople from 1897 to 1912, met with Tewfik Pasha, the Foreign Minister of Ottoman Turkey to discuss the matter.

The German position was that this request exceeded the authority granted by article 2. They also argued that the requirements and interests of Islam should be taken into account. It was blasphemous that a Christian should command a Muslim. A second demand was made, requesting 60 foreign officers for the mission, “executive power” was defined, and the power to “denounce” gendarmes was defined as “removing” them. The Turkish government accepted 25 officers for each sector, with additional officers brought in as needed. The military attaches considered 5 officers per sector as insufficient. Giesl wanted to increase the amount of Austrian officers in the vilayet of Kosovo. Degiorgis accused Austria of seeking to advance its own interests and influence in the region at the expense of the reforms.

	Johann von Salis-Seewis, a former member of Austrian Army intelligence, was an advisor to the Austrian mission to the Kosovo vilayet.

The European powers pressured the Turks to impose reform in Macedonia by a display of naval power in 1904. On November 11, the Great Powers staged a naval demonstration off of the Straits. On November 26, they sent five warships to seize the port city of Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. On December 5, 1904, a naval squadron seized the Lemnos customs house. The Ottoman regime soon agreed to reform Macedonian finances. On December 16, the Turks accepted an international control plan for Macedonia. The Great Powers then evacuated Lemnos.

The Turkish government finally agreed to accept the 23 officers when Britain, France, Italy, Austria, and Russia made the demand in the form of an ultimatum, with Germany abstaining. To preempt and to sabotage the mission, however, Hamid enacted his own reorganization scheme for the gendarmerie in Macedonia.

The Austrians sought to keep the members of the international mission out of Albanian areas. The Austrians accused Degiorgis of expanding the Italian zone to the Albanian areas using Karl Ingvar Nandrup. Degiorgis had received Hilmi Pasha’s permission to send Nandrup to Pristina and Unander to Koritza west of the Italian sector. Degiorgis backed down and the decision was made to keep Nandrup in Skopje and to keep Unander subordinate to the orders of Hilmi Pasha.
 
On May, 23, 1905, the arrest of Romanian or Vlach school inspectors by the Turks and the assault on the Romanian consulate on the orders of the vali of Yannina provoked a diplomatic crisis. This led to the creation of a separate Vlach nationality or “millet” in Macedonia, with its own official language schools and churches. Ottoman Turkey was divided into millets, or communities based on religious affiliation who were autonomous with their own religious leaders and own laws and customs and language. The Turkish government supported this splintering of groups in Macedonia because it divided the Christian populations even further and pitted the Christians against each other.

Great Power Rivalry

Austria sought to extend its own sector in 1906 by sending its officers to the northern cazas of Gnilanje in Kosovo and the Preshevo Valley in southern Serbia. In March, 1907, Austria received permission from Hilmi Pasha to send an Austrian officer, Captain Franz Schmidt to Preshevo. The Serbian and Albanian population opposed the deployment of Schmidt. The Turks sent Shemsi Pasha, the commander of the Turkish 18th division to Kosovska Mitrovica to establish order. On April 18, Schmidt was recalled to Skopje. By the end of the year, however, these two cazas would be attached to the Austrian sector.

The establishment of international administrative structures in Macedonia was hampered by the rivalries among the Great Powers and the abstention of Germany. Italy and Austria were rivals over the establishment of a strategic presence in the Balkans, especially in the Albanian regions.

The Great Powers were determined to use the conflict in Macedonia to advance their own national interests while neglecting the human and civil rights of the Christian population. Decision-making was hampered by the fact that negotiations, debates, and discussions would be needed before the divergent interests and goals of the six Great powers could be reconciled. This resulted in compromises and half-measures that led to delays and indecision.

	Alois Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia, originally proposed the Murzsteg Reform Plan for the Kosovo vilayet.

The arrival of the international officers was greeted favorably by the Macedonian Slav population. The Greeks were more hostile. The Christians saw the officers “as protection against the arbitrariness of the Ottoman administration.” The French military attaché reported that in the vilayet of Kosovo, “the arrival of Austro-Hungarian officers in the vilayet had irritated the Serbians, and Bulgarians and the Turkish or Albanian Moslems.” The Muslims in Skopje of the “well-to-do classes” were hostile to the Austrian officers who opposed the rights granted to Christians where the official religion was Islam. They saw the increase in rights to Christians as an insult and a humiliation for Islam. Christians were rayah or Ghiaours, dogs or a herd, in Muslim society. One of the officers noted that: “They consider us more or less like a plague from God. As for the Turkish authorities, they hate us, but respect us.” Captain Leon Falconetti noted that the Turks maintain “a conspiracy of silence”.

The French commander Dupont wrote that Austria was guided by an ulterior motive to occupy the Skopje vilayet under the cover of the reforms. According to the French, the Austrians only sought to increase their influence and to advance their interests in the region. During their inspection tours, the French military attaché accused them of establishing contacts with the Albanian leaders. They were accused of merely spying and reconnoitering the area.

The Austrians did not plan to occupy the Kosovo vilayet, but they did strengthen their position in Skopje to prevent Serbian claims on Kosovo. The Austrian-Hungarian mission chief, Lt. Colonel Johann Graf von Salis-Seewis, born in Karlovac in Croatia-Slavonia, “showed a careful attention to the Serbs, and deplored their openly malevolent attitude with regard to the Austrian mission.” He blamed this attitude on “Serbian propaganda”. Austria-Hungary attempted to “use” the Albanian leaders to preclude Italian involvement and to “oppose the ambitions of Belgrade”. From 1901 to 1904, Salis-Seewis was a part of the intelligence section of the Austrian Army. From 1904 to 1906, he was an advisor to the international commission in the Kosovo vilayet, stationed in Skopje, Salonika, and Constantinople. During World War I, Salis-Seewis led the first attack against Serbia in 1914. Under General der Infanterie Liborious Frank's 5th army, Salis-Seewis's brigade was part of the disastrous Austrian invasion of Serbia from Bosnia that was driven back across the Drina River.

Austria, under this argument, preferred the instability in these areas because they justified the Austrian presence and because they obstructed Serbian and Italian designs on the region. From 1904 to 1908, the Albanian districts between Prizren and Pec were in constant revolt and turmoil, but they were excluded from the reforms. These areas were contiguous to the Austrian and Italian zones.

The mission of the international officers was complex and ambiguous and hampered by a lack of communications. On July 26, 1904, Colonel Ferdinand Richter was the victim of a murder attempt by an Albanian gendarme, Hassan Emin, who shot up his apartment in Kumanovo. The officers established a network of gendarmerie stations, expanding on the karakols, for greater security. The gendarmes also made agreements with mokhtars, the chiefs of villages. A gendarme school was established in Salonika in 1904, where 3,000 gendarmes would be educated from 1904 to 1908.

The gendarmes would regularly tour the crisis areas and routinely file reports. There were instances when the gendarmes were attacked. At the Kumanovo station, it was reported by the Austrian officer that it was “unstable” because “Albanian gangs” spread terror in the region. The Albanians began shooting at the gendarme but he managed to escape.

The gendarmes had a delicate “political role” because they were tasked with reporting on abuses of the Turkish officials while they were dependent upon them for their safety and well-being. There was a conflict of interest. They could not execute their mandate effectively because they only had an advisory role. They had a limited mandate. Their goals under Murzsteg were to reorganize the gendarmerie and to bring order, safety, and stability. They could only counsel. They could not command.

The way this dilemma was resolved was that they would report the abuses directly to their respective consuls. The reports then would be transmitted to the respective governments of the Great Powers. Degiorgis sought to maintain “impartiality” in the mandate but bias was often revealed. The Austrians favored the Albanians while the Russians favored the Serbs. Germany supported the Ottoman Turkish government. The bias and hidden agendas would be a hindrance to the effective implementation of the reforms.

There was a stagnant bureaucracy and sabotage and procrastination by the Turkish officials. In November, 1905, Colonel Charles Verand of the French delegates sent 200 petitions, only 20 of whom were resolved. The Christian population at first had high expectations of results. But they were later disappointed and felt betrayed and deceived because, in fact, the officers had limited powers.

There was no consensus for the reforms. Ultimately, the Great Powers acted to advance their own interests in the Kosovo vilayet, in Kosovo-Metohija and Macedonia, and not to achieve any meaningful reform or to help the Christian population.