

**Reply of the Royal Serbian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914.**

**The Royal Servian Government** have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, \* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding, which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

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\* Old Style.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina\* and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of 5 societies— manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

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\* The Servian Parliament.

**Remarks**

**The Royal Servian Government** confine themselves to asserting that, since the declarations on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighborly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

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**For these reasons the Royal Government have** been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to **be published on the first page of the " Journal officiel,** "on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: —

Remarks

The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utterances in the press and the activities of societies ate of a private character and are not subject too official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States; even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

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" The Royal-Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary - *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim as to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal Consequences of these criminal proceedings.

Remarks

**This proposition is incorrect; the Servian Government** were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction.

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**The Royal Government regrets that, according** to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in

the abovementioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March 1909.

Remarks

**our demand ran: —**

" The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary...

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognizant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

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**The Royal Government further undertakes: —**

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the: Skuptchina\*a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

Remarks

**we had demanded of them: —**

1. " To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure that Servia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Servia offers us the enactment of certain laws that would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz.: —

(a) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it well known that the prosecution of press offenses on their merits (*subjectiv*) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory - all the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupstchina - apart from the possible resignation of the Government - everything would be as it was before.

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**2. The Government possess no proof, nor does** the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society that may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

Remarks

**the whole of the public life of Serbia** teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required: —

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

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**3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes** to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

Remarks

**In this case also the Servian Government first ask for** proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here, too, the Servian Government have not complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired "both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction" - an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Servian schools is to be looked for.

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**4. The Royal Government also agree to remove** from the military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

Remarks

**Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach** to their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable bylaw in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

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**5. The Royal Government must confess that** they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration

as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th\* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to Austro-Hungarian agents.

Remarks

**International Law has just as little to do with this** question, as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form, in which it is couched, to lead to insurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation. We desired: —

(1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto ("*recherches* " as opposed to "*enquête judiciaire*").

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "*enquêtejudiciare*" and simple "*recherches* " must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

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**7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the** very evening of the delivery of the note,

to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ziganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th\* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

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\* Old style.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures that have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

Remarks

**this answer is disingenuous.**

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganovic was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and traveled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganovic had left the Servian State Service on the 27th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganovic and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic existed in Belgrade.

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**9. The Royal Government will gladly give** explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in questioning these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution

of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Remarks

**The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government.** By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

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**The Austro-Hungarian Red Book.  
Section III, Enclosure, Nos. 35-69, 1914-1915**

**No. 35.  
Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.  
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.**

The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined so far as Germany is concerned on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Servia.

**No. 36.  
Freiherr von Müller to Count Berchtold.  
(Telegraphic.) Tokyo, July 28, 1914.**

To-day's semi-official " Japan Times " contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the strictest neutrality.

**No. 37.  
Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade.  
(Translated from the French.)  
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.**

The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

**No. 38.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.**

For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State: —

I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, dated the 27th inst.: —

" I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self-defense and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independence. What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szápáry.

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue.

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to day amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refraining from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Servia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the maneuvers, and which should have dispersed to-day, would for the present remain there.' We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled we cannot at this moment send them home again.'

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilizes and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down.

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events.

**No. 39.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.**

We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia in general; and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being sent to you by post, and that you will emphasize the specially salient passages; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of the note with our observations has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), and you should make clear to him that the offer of Servia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to, deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future.

As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can easily be see-through: Servia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilization of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had made no military preparations, but by the Servian mobilization we were compelled to do so.

**No. 40.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.**

For your Excellency's information and guidance: The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant), in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Servia had gone far in meeting our wishes but that some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable a fact that he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be

regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view.

In reply, I emphasized my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement that had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to day been declared against Serbia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our restless neighbor, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience that we had shown towards Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian provocation in the only form that in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.

**No. 41.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.**

The British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me today has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conduct with Serbia as follows: —

The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach importance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Serbia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Serbia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at

London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in common with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual contact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Governments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision involving bloodshed; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing without accepting battle. The reply that had reached us from Servia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide a lame basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum. Servia had endeavored to get out of her difficulty by subterfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge that he has gained here, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts.

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that Great Powers placing themselves behind Servia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment would not save the peace of Europe.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agreement, Servia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realized. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

**No. 42.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.  
(Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914.**

I request your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name: —

"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honor, as has also the Russian Minister of Wars that mobilization has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the military districts which border on Austria-Hungary - Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Rasan - will be mobilized, should our troops cross the Servian frontier.

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire."

In order to make it easier for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most elective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude.

**No. 43.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.  
(Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914.**

Information has been received from the Imperial German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration.

**No. 44.**

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.**

**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 99, 1914.**

For your Excellency's information:

I have to day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a *démarche* made here by him:

### **Memorandum**

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst. with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Government should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points that are not accepted are, however, precisely those that contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their astonishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin. The basis of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Servia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time of the *démarche* made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia had already arisen, and the Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilization of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to

elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on our side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Powers, and with a view to the localization of the war that has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.

**No. 45.**  
**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 29, 1914.**

France is unmistakably making certain military preparations as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exaggeration.

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would be dangerous. Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between Servia and us should remain localized, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France.

**No. 46.**  
**Count Szogyény to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.**

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilization would have as a consequence German mobilization.

Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst. Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize.

**No. 47.**  
**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.**

As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilization of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localized, of annexing Servian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognized our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form that would be acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Servian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (*lizitieren*) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that *he could communicate this to the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day.*

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilization in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution that the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's attention to the impression that such a measure would

make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure.

**No. 48.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Szogyény to at Berlin.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.**

I have just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilized. He said that Russia was outraged in her honor as a Great Power, and was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilization is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché, in a conversation that M. Sazonof had to day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasize that if the Russian measures of mobilization are not stopped without delay, our general mobilization would have, on military grounds, to follow at once.

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilization, would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions.

**No. 49.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.**

In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July:

I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to Servia, which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions that afflict directly our relations towards

Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities that have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbors, which is so desirable an object.

**No. 50.**  
**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.**

For Your Excellency's information and guidance:—

I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as to a discussion with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired with regard to the note - which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorized your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our special relations towards Russia.

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact that the Ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we were a Great Power that was proceeding against the small Servian State, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate of Servia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with reference to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Servia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these

circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible authorities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian mobilization that had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between Russia and us. Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia; against Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps had not been mobilized. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilizing against us, we should have to extend our mobilization too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilization.

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his government, and this he promised to do.

**No. 51.**  
**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.**

I am telegraphing as follows to Berlin:—

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador:—

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation *à quatre*, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilization of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the

Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.

**No. 52.**  
**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.**

The order for the general mobilization of the entire Army and Fleet was issued early to day.

**No. 53.**  
**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.**

For your information and for use in your dealings with the Government to which you are accredited.

As the Russian Government on our frontier has ordered mobilization, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neighborly relations.

*Pourparlers* between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope that things will quiet down all round.

**No. 54.**  
**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Paris, July .31, 1914.**

German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his Government has declared here that if the general mobilization ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

**No. 55.**  
**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.**

Your Excellency's telegram of the 30th July has been received.

You will have gathered from my telegram of the 29th July, that without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the territory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere; since then moreover a general mobilization has been ordered on the part of Russia.

**No. 56.**  
**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.**

I visited M. Sazonof to day, and told him that I had received instructions, but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general Russian mobilization, and that in interpreting the instructions that I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him. Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.

I emphasized how much the instructions of Your Excellency afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilization was unknown to me; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London. I replied that Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestions to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency.

**No. 57.**  
**Count Szogyény to Count Berchtold.**  
**(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 9, 1914.**

The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand.

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (south-east of Bialla). Russia has thus attacked Germany.

Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports; he intends to leave to day.

**No. 58.**

**Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.  
(Telegraphic.) London, August 4, 1914.**

I have just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government has sent to Germany an ultimatum on account of Belgium. They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to night.

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

**No. 59.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.  
(Translated from the French.)  
(Telegraphic.) . Vienna, August 5, 1914.**

I ask Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honor to inform His Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:—

" In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment."

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the entire staff of the Embassy with the exception

of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time we are furnishing M. Schebeko with his passport.

**No. 60.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.  
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914.**

I have received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war.

**No. 61.**

**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.  
(Translated from the French.)  
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 8, 1914.**

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information that has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it, is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the dispatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency.

**No. 62.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen at Paris.  
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 9, 1914.**

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant.

After conferring with the General Staff I authorize Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine.

**No. 63.**

**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.  
(Translated from the French.)  
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1914.**

I have received your telegram of the 9th August and communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M.

Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In these circumstances he has authorized the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion to regrettable occurrences that he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared.

**No. 64.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.  
Vienna, August 11, 1914.**

The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador hereto ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those German districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded.

**No. 65.**

**Count Mensdorf to Count Berchtold.  
(Translated from the French.)  
(Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914.**

I have just received from Sir E. Grey the following communication:—

At the request of the French Government, who is not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication:—

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France:—

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France.

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances that amounted to a direct menace to France.

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures that make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats.

Sir E. Grey adds:—

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 o'clock to night.

**No. 66.**

**The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.**

**(Translated from the English.)**

**Vienna, August 20, 1914.**

My Lord, Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Müller of the communication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter that I have received from Tokyo.

**Enclosure.** The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Government, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words:—

"(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighborhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

(2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China.

The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them.

It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end."

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree.

**No. 67.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.**

**(Translated from the French.)**

**(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 22, 1914.**

I ask your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once:—

" I have the honor to bring the following to the knowledge of your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Government:—

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government.

**No. 68.**

**Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.  
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, 1914.**

The Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokyo, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan, at 12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Charge d'Affaires here with his passports.

At mid-day the Chargé d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

**No. 69. Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Müller at Tokyo.(Telegraphic.) Vienna,  
August 24, 1914.**

The Commander of S.M.S. "Elisabeth" has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports.