By Aleksandar Mitic
1) WHY SHOULD ONE SIDE GET IT ALL, THE OTHER SIDE LOSE IT ALL?
The independence of Kosovo is a maximalist solution in which one side
– the Albanian community – gets it all, and the other side – the Kosovo
Serbs and Serbia – loses it all. The Kosovo Serbs and Serbia will never
accept this solution – it can only be imposed but can never be a result
of a compromise. Such a solution also plants on the long run the seeds
of injustice, frustration and instability in the region.
2) WHY CREATE A COMPLETELY NEW STATE FROM THE SCRATCH?
An independent Kosovo would be a completely unprincipled solution for
the borders in the Balkans, after that same independence was refused to
some other nations during the 1990s. Let’s take the example of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is, under the Dayton accords, composed of two entities
– the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim and Croat entity) and
the Republika Srpska (Serb entity). Just as Kosovo, Republika Srpska is
a protectorate, with the troops from NATO countries on its soil. Just as
in Kosovo, some 90% of its population is made of one ethnic community.
Strategically, the Serbs as the majority community in Republika Srpska
have the same aspirations as the Kosovo Albanians: to become independent.
But in Republika Srpska, the international community is tearing down all
existing symbols and structures of statehood, even those allowed by the
Dayton peace accords. Republika Srpska is in fact, in the process of being
absorbed in a centralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the proclaimed
name of stability, multiethnicity and European integration – but against
the will of the majority community.
In Kosovo, only 100km south, that same international community is doing
a completely opposite thing: it is building a new state from the scratch
and treating Kosovo as an “independent state in the making”. Is there any
logic in that?
3) WHY BREAKUP THE MOST MULTIETHNIC COUNTRY IN THE REGION?
Just as it rushed with the breakup of the former multiethnic Yugoslavia
in the early 1990s, with an independence of Kosovo, the international community
could be rushing to break up Serbia, the most multiethnic country in the
Balkans. If the majority Albanian community in Kosovo gets independence,
what kind of example would that represent for the Muslim majority in the
Sandzak region, the Albanian one in southern Serbia, the Serbian one in
eastern Montenegro, the Albanian one in western Macedonia, the Serbian
one in eastern Slavonia or the Hungarian one in northern Vojvodina?
4) WHY ENDANGER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
It is clear that Kosovo could get independence only outside the UN
Security Council, where at least Russia and China would veto such an option
(due to Taiwan, Tibet, Chechenya). A solution without the UN Security Council
approval would be a new slap in the face of international law. The framework
for the resolution of the future status of Kosovo can be found in the resolution
1244 of the UN Security Council. Under that resolution, “the people of
Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”,
nowadays Serbia and Montenegro. In Resolution 1244 "self-governing" is
mentioned 3 times, "self-government" 4 times, "self-administration" 1 time,
"substantial autonomy" 3 times whereas neither "self-determination" nor
"independence" is mentioned in the document. The "sovereignty" of Yugoslavia
is mentioned 3 times.
5) WHY WOULD KOSOVO BE AN EXCEPTION IN THE WORLD?
Kosovo cannot be an exception in the world. It would be necessary to
carefully consider the future status of Kosovo since it would likely have
an effect on secessionist movements elsewhere in the region, in Europe
and in the world: Basque province, Corsica, Tibet, Taiwan, Kurdistan, Scotland,
Quebec, Tamil Eelam, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Northern Cyprus, Kashmir,
Southern Thailand, etc. All the secessionist movements in the world will
follow with great attention the situation in Kosovo as a possible precedent.
6) WHY DID NATO INTERVENE IN 1999?
Given the developments in Kosovo since 1999, the independence of Kosovo
would, sooner or later, most probably lead to a monoethnic Albanian Kosovo.
As such, it would completely undermine the arguments of those who supported
the NATO bombings in 1999 in the name of the “multiethnicity” of Kosovo.
The bombing of 1999 would historically be seen as a campaign for the independence
of Kosovo, which is light years away from the proclaimed goals of a “humanitarian
intervention”.
7) WHY PUNISH THE DEMOCRATIC SERBIA?
The democratic authorities in Belgrade are firmly on the pro-European
road. They have obtained a positive EU Feasibility Study, are adopting
European laws and reforms proposed by the international financial institutions.
They have established an efficient cooperation with the International War
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague (all those indicted for the 1999 war crimes
in Kosovo are in The Hague). Serbia has fulfilled all security demands
required in the process of reforms: it has respected from A to Z the articles
of the 1999 Kumanovo accords with NATO on the retreat of security structures
from Kosovo; it has shown restraint and close cooperation with NATO in
the management of the Albanian uprising in 2000-01 in southern Serbia;
it has succeeded in preventing the spillover of violence from Kosovo to
the rest of Serbia during the March 2004 massive anti-Serb violence in
Kosovo; it has been praised by Western diplomats for its management of
ethnic tensions in southern Serbia and in the Vojvodina province; it has
reformed its military and police structures along the lines of the standards
of the OSCE and the Partnership for Peace. It is proposing a compromising
solution for the future status of Kosovo.
Why punish it with the loss of a part of its territory, a birthplace
of the Serbian state, which is still today home to some 1,300 Serbian monasteries,
churches and other Orthodox objects – many of them jewels of medieval architecture.
What kind of consequence would an independence of Kosovo have on democracy
in Serbia? If the Albanian side gets a maximum of its demands just so that
it does not provoke new tensions and conflicts, who can guarantee that
Serbs would peacefully watch and accept the loss of Kosovo? Does that mean
that the threat of barbarism and violence is winning over interethnic cooperation
and tolerance?
8) WHY CREATE A SECOND ALBANIAN STATE?
The independence of Kosovo and its likely monoethnic character would
mean the creation of a second Albanian national state in the world: the
nation of “Kosovars” in fact does not exist in the European meaning of
the word. There are Albanians, Serbs and other communities who live in
Kosovo. On the other side, according to the UNDP, there are some 5,000
different ethnic groups living in some 200 countries of the world. Under
the figures of the study “Minorities at Risk”, some 509 ethnic groups in
the world consider themselves as politically discriminated. A huge number
of them are dreaming of autonomy. Why would one nation – the Albanian one
– get two independent STATES?
9) WHY IMPOSE INDEPENDENCE AS “THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO”?
The key objective should be to give the Kosovo Albanians a maximum
of opportunities and real means to manage their future without feeling
threatened, but also without threatening the interests of other groups,
the security and the shaky stability of the region. Within the principles
of the international community (no return to the situation from before
1999, no joining to neighbouring states, no partition), there is a series
of options that look much more like a compromise that an imposed solution
of independence. A sustainable and just solution is one that lies between
the standard autonomy for Kosovo - unacceptable for the Albanian aspirations
- and the full, "conditional" or "immediate" independence - unacceptable
for the Serbs and the Serbian state. Between these two, there is a myriad
of thinkable options - for Kosovo in the region and internally inside Kosovo:
substantial autonomy, confederation, Kosovo as a Euro region, the Hong
Kong model (one state – two systems), South Tirol, Bavaria, etc.
10) WHY CREATE NEW STATES IN A "BORDERLESS EUROPE"?
If the entire southeastern Europe is going towards European integration
and membership in the European Union – where borders are no longer “important”,
if this process is underway and will be finished in the decade to come,
why create a new state in the heart of Europe? Why create new borders at
such high cost if those same borders will be brought down in the matter
of several years? Where is the logic of European integration in the independence
of Kosovo?
University of Belgrade, July
21, 2005